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Introduction 
The impacts on the markets are one of the key points in the anal-
ysis of several factors for those who operate in financial markets. 
Through impacts we can capture the market trends, and conse-
quently also the structure, the transparency and the prevalence of 
traders that operate inside a specific market. 
Transparency is a fundamental element in the design and regula-
tion of a market. It can be interpreted in different typologies and, 
it can often be associated with a market capacity to bring stock 
values as possible to what we know as fundamental value. All the 
markets around the world have decided to apply regulation in or-
der to stabilize the markets and make them more efficient and 
transparent. The ability of participants to observe information is 
the principal point for a transparent market. An important aspect 
of transparency concerns the effect of widely publicizing infor-
mation about investors latent demands present in the limit order 
book. The typologies of transparency regulations, however, are 
not always the same in all the markets of the world, and this may 
cause some difficulties from a valuation point of view. Transpar-
ency strategies have a great influence in relation to the regulation 
stabilized, for example transparency has a great influence on de-
bates as floor versus automated trading systems, informational 
advantages of market-makers, and intermarket competition be-
tween trading systems with different levels of transparency. 
A solution seems to be associated in favor with a particular stra-
tegic trading form, sunshine trading. 
Sunshine traders are traders who announce to the market who they 
are, what they intend to do, the full extent of their orders, and why 
they intend to trade1.  Sunshine trading works well when sunshine 
                                                          
1 Larry Harris, 2002. Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Prac-
titioners. Oxford University Press. 
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traders are well known and are known to be uninformed and hon-
est. In large markets, sunshine trading at best works only for the 
largest traders, since only those traders will be able to acquire 
credible reputation. 
The strategy of sunshine trading does not work if traders suspect 
that the sunshine trader may be well informed or dishonest. If 
traders could always obtain more liquidity merely by revealing 
their identities, all traders would do so. 
Despite several studies and traders sharing the opinion that sun-
shine trading could be a real solution for the great number of prob-
lems affecting the trading market, principally related to the in-
formativeness, sometimes it could be a strategy not so efficient 
given the fact that to support a strategy like that, there should be 
some optimal conditions that in some markets are not realistically 
possible. Starting from this point of view, it is clear that sunshine 
trading before being implemented needs special interpretive rat-
ing based on associating this strategy with particular markets and 
particular actions.  
Therefore, the study of impacts, becomes a good element; in my 
analysis they are studied in order to be split into temporary and 
permanent impacts, in this way we can understand how sunshine 
trading, or any other market strategy, moves the market itself, 
making it more transparent, and thus more informative because 
of its ability to reveal the fundamental value, or contrarily, more 
chaotic due to its ability to cause actual values from what is the 
fundamental-value. 
Based on these comments, I decided to structure the thesis as fol-
lows. 
The next section describes the transparency and its implication on 
the financial markets around the world, the historical evolution of 
capital markets and how they are organized today. Followed by a 
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detailed analysis of past studies dealing with the subject of trans-
parency with appropriate personal impressions, and a study of the 
phenomenon of insider trading. 
In chapter 2, I’m going to discuss the phenomenon of sunshine 
trading, who they are and what they intend to do in the markets. 
It follows a detailed analysis of all past studies with appropriate 
critical view of past literature.  
In chapter 3, I examine a personal study which is based on the 
valuation of the equity market impact, through a trajectory cost 
model that divides the impacts into permanent and temporary. 
The dataset on which the analysis is based is composed by the last 
two years movement of the most common stock in the S&P 500, 
from January 2014 to December 2015. The data is downloaded 
from Google-finance and is a variation measurement of one mi-
nute’s time. 
 In chapter 4, connecting us to the analysis of the previous chap-
ter, I use the feed-back of permanent and temporary impact to as-
sess how sunshine trading effects the markets, and how this strat-
egy might modify the same markets with a greater or lesser trans-
parency. I try to determine how a specific drift and a particular 
characteristic can influence the choice of a trader. My goal is to 
find out a linear and clear result in order to be able to make com-
parison and consideration. With this analysis I will try to get a 
final result where a trader choose his actions giving is acceptable 
level of risk, the strategy adopted, the market where he/she oper-
ates and the stocks selected. This could be a good starting point 
to analyze all the possible strategies and all the possible scenarios 
that can be presented, and at the same time a good analysis to 
understand how operations can influence the transparency of a 
market. 
At the end of the chapter, I made a small extension linked to other 
hypothetical market strategies that can occur within a market in 
order to make a comparison with our focal topic of the thesis, 
sunshine trading. 
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1 Transparency and its impli-
cations 
Transparency is a fundamental issue in the design and regulation 
of markets. All the markets around the world have decided to ap-
ply regulation in order to stabilize the markets and make them 
more efficient and transparent. In the United States, the most im-
portant trade market, is regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), and its point of view is very clear: “The 
Commission has long believed that transparency, the real time, 
public dissemination of trade and quote information plays a fun-
damental role in the fairness and efficiency of the secondary mar-
kets.[…] Transparency helps to link dispersed markets and im-
proves the price discovery, fairness, competitiveness and attrac-
tiveness of U.S. markets”2.  
The ability of participants to observe information is the principal 
point for a transparent market. An important aspect of transpar-
ency concerns the effect of widely publicizing information about 
investors latent demands present in the limit order book. The trad-
ing markets around the world have a lot of controversial debates, 
where transparency strategies have a great influence in relation to 
the regulation stabilized, for example transparency has a great in-
fluence on debates as floor versus automated trading systems, in-
formational advantages of market-makers, and intermarket com-
petition between trading systems with different levels of transpar-
ency. 
  
 
                                                          
2 De Frutos, M.A., Manzano, C., 2002. Risk Aversion, Transparency and Mar-
ket Performance. Journal of Finance. SEC Market 2000 Study. 
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1.1 Capital Markets Contest and 
History 
 
From a market structure we can understand many things, and 
sometimes we can understand why there are determined trends in 
respect to other markets, or why there are more trading in one 
market in respect to another. We can say that market structures 
give the big picture and focus on how and why securities trade. 
Today’s market structure is certainly different from security trad-
ers working in 1934, a world were shouts, gestures and the floor 
was the essence of trading. The Securities Act Amendments of 
1975 provided a significant regulatory push to create a national 
market system (NMS) where computers, new telecommunica-
tions tools, and the advent of information systems began to have 
a deep and lasting impact on the security markets. The principal 
points were obviously clear: higher transparency of market infor-
mation, higher speed and efficiency of the market, fair trading and 
ensuring that orders get the best price.  The last three decades 
have seen a lot of progress on those fronts3. The securities trading 
infrastructure was rebuilt. In a very short time, it became better, 
stronger and faster. However, on the other hand, it also became 
darker and more opaque. 
The important step in understanding the transparency character-
istic of a market is related to the regulation of the markets in re-
lation to the actual contest and history, in fact every market has a 
different level of regulation and in many aspects they can be dif-
ferent and change the view and drift of a market. 
Consistent with this view, all the U.S. market centers must imme-
diately report trade price and volumes, as well as provide the best 
outstanding bid and ask quote to traders. Centralized exchanges 
                                                          
3 Kara M. Stein - Market Structure in the 21st Century: Bringing Light to the 
Dark, 2015. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.  
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are required to report all such information immediately.4 The U.S. 
market based their structure on three hallmarks: competition, in-
novation, and growth; but, today it is really hard to say that US 
securities markets is the best structure.  
Financial markets have resulted in an improvement of security 
systems, making markets stronger and, in a certain aspect, more 
resilient. Trades are executed in less than half a millionth of a 
second and, in respect to the past, markets are undoubtedly faster, 
providing a level of service that many could not have imagined 
thirty years ago. 
On the contrary, today’s markets are also complicated, intercon-
nected, and fragmented. Too often the hidden parts of the market 
eclipse the lit parts and, complex products and strategies operate 
within the market which is often not well understood by investors, 
by the public and by regulators. This is in large part a function of 
the incredible technological changes that have transformed secu-
rity trading.  Practices and regulations that had been well-defined 
in the “human era” of our markets now seem obsolete, as humans 
have been replaced with machine-to-machine interactions.  The 
current environment sometimes feels closer to a massive com-
puter game than a system dedicated to allocating capital effi-
ciently and serving investors5.  
As well as the US securities markets, it is also interesting to ana-
lyze the U.K. market. For the U.K. regulatory body the beneficial 
view of transparency is not universally accepted. The securities 
and Investment Board (SIB) has argued that there is an important 
difference between quote transparency and trade transparency. Of 
                                                          
4 For a dispersed dealer market such as the NASDAQ, the rules are somewhat 
different. Before 1982, the SEC required that the NASDAQ report all equity 
traders within 90 seconds of occurring (Regulating Exchanges and Alternative 
Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective 1999). 
5 Kara M. Stein - Market Structure in the 21st Century: Bringing Light to the 
Dark, 2015. U.S. Security and exchange commission. 
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particular importance is their view that there is “a tradeoff be-
tween liquidity and trade transparency”. This presumed trade-off 
arises because knowledge of trades may expose market makers to 
undue risk as they unwind positions, and consequently “transpar-
ency should be restricted if this is necessary to assure adequate 
liquidity”6. 
The debate in the U.K. is still open and some think that restricting 
transparency provides major benefits to large traders and less to 
small traders. Still others, for example, the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) in the United Kingdom, have questioned whether restrict-
ing transparency may also reduce the speed with which market 
makers adjust prices, thereby reducing market efficiency7. An-
other complication is introduced by the role of quote transpar-
ency, the SIB has suggested that the dissemination of quotes may, 
probably, substitute for post trade information “by providing trad-
ers with sufficient information to make informed trading deci-
sions”. Currently, in the U.K. the debate is still very active and 
the role of quote transparency remains conjectural, and this em-
phasizes the general lack of knowledge surrounding the effects of 
transparency on market behavior. 
Written in both the London Stock exchange and the Paris bourse 
the availability of post trade information is a subject of intense 
debate, where transparency issues are seen as fundamental to the 
competitiveness of the market. The Paris bourse was affected by 
many difficulties in relation to the transparency effects: the Paris 
market required full trade transparency, but it lost trading volume 
compared to the London Stock exchange where transparency was 
restricted. Paris changed from a transparent to a less transparent 
regime for large trades in attempt to resume trade quantity8.  
 Regarding the Paris Bourse, trade takes place anonymously for 
many stocks. According to exchange officials concealing trader 
                                                          
6 SIB discussion paper feb.1994 
7 Franks and Shaefer 1995 
8 Gemmil 1996. 
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identity reduces the opportunity for the market to identify the 
transactions of liquidity providers and engage in trading practices 
that make it more costly to unwind inventory positions. 
However, a more anonymous market structure protects the iden-
tities of informed traders. By increasing the effective amount of 
noise in the market, anonymity may permit insiders to better ex-
ploit their private information. Equally, in the case of Paris bourse 
(but also for the other markets that decided to make these deci-
sions), this results in larger adverse selection risk and wider bid-
ask spreads. 
 
1.1.1 Financial Markets today 
 
Looking at the past we can see without uncertainty that the US 
market was the most important market in the world, but given the 
fact that the market quality, uncertainty and of course transpar-
ency has a crucial role for the actual efficiency something has 
changed compared to the past.  
London has dethroned New York as the world's top financial cen-
ter, according to an index released by the Geneva-based World 
Economic Forum (WEF)9. 
The most interesting data is given by the WEF Financial Devel-
opment Index where 55 countries are ranked taking into account 
the technological development and the stability of their financial 
systems and markets. The nations were studied according to more 
than 120 criteria, ranging from the favorableness of their institu-
tional and business environments to the size of their equity and 
bond markets, and from their technology infrastructure and hu-
man capital to the ease of obtaining consumer and commercial 
loans. 
                                                          
9  Tim Wallace, 2015. Telegraph, finance, banks and finance. 
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Perhaps the biggest surprise in this study, was that Britain take 
the N°1 position even if it has its economic problem. Britain’s 
problems are not principally related to the finance structure but 
from a division structure, many people think that Britain give too 
much power to London as epicenter and low consideration around 
the big city, but, as a matter of fact the financial sector is based 
on London and in particular is buoyed by the relative strength of 
its financial markets, particularly in foreign exchange and deriv-
atives, and by its world-beating insurance coverage. 
The relevant news, perhaps not as surprising, was that the U.S. 
goes down from N° 1 to N° 3. USA are still far from the wealthi-
est, taking into account the financial instability, the transparency 
problem and an alarming weakened banking. As a matter of fact, 
the Britain position has a weak stability. The country continues to 
be weighed down by recession, principally given by a structural 
unbalanced economy, while the U.S. reported a return to growth 
in gross domestic product. 
Other aspects can explain the prediction above, for example the 
Britain government has been criticized in recent months for ex-
cessive intervention in the financial sector, and there is rising con-
cern over increased regulation and higher tax rates, which could 
encourage London-based hedge funds and other financial inter-
mediaries to move elsewhere. To be clear, the evaluation of the 
top developed nation goes down critically, principally because of 
the effects of the credit crisis, hence the first places that suffered 
the most from lowered financial stability was the largest industri-
alized economies. On the contrary, emerging economies have a 
good position, they can improve their markets in order to destroy 
the gap, and with an optimal structural base they can do it, con-
sidering the transparency and their consequences as a crucial ele-
ment that is the reason why the crisis is so strong in the top coun-
tries. The principal problems for these countries are underdevel-
oped infrastructures, murky legal and regulatory regimes, or weak 
corporate governance; only a few countries have good financial 
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access for consumers and small businesses, as measured by the 
availability of credit and the penetration of retail banking services 
such as savings accounts, microcredit, branch offices, and point 
of sale financial services.  
Top nations still hold a vast edge aside from the relative strength-
ening achieved by developing countries, the most intriguing result 
for the researchers who put together this study was that Australia 
leapfrogged over the U.S. The Australian market is in greater ex-
pansion principally thanks to the great possibility of investment 
and a relative new strong financial structure that gives the oppor-
tunity to consider this country as one of the best performers in the 
world. “While we expected the relative stability of the Australian 
banking system to strengthen the country's ranking, we were sur-
prised at just how significantly its overall ranking jumped10”. 
Apart from Australia, all of the countries in the top 10 saw signif-
icant declines in their overall scores, registering a strong decline. 
This shows how badly the economic crisis impacted on most ma-
jor financial systems. What allowed countries such as Britain and 
the U.S. to remain near the top of the list, despite big hits to their 
financial stability, was the breadth of other factors taken into con-
sideration in the most important rankings. However, their markets 
have been volatile, these and other top-ranked countries still offer 
deeper pools of capital, more financial transparency, and a host 
of other institutional and infrastructural advantages that will 
likely keep them among the leaders in financial development for 
years to come11.  
The drop in scores for both the U.K. and the U.S. indicate that 
their leadership is clearly unstable, the alarming discovery is the 
facility of how scores have dropped and their relative distance to 
other countries has diminished. 
                                                          
10 James Bilodeau of the World Economic Forum, who co-authored the study with 
Roubini 
11 Leona Liu – Global Finance: Britain is No. 1. Bloomberg Business. 
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1.2 Transparency and market qual-
ity 
 
One important question is if the transparency is really so im-
portant for the market quality and in which way affects market 
behavior.  
Transparency can be viewed in different ways but from our anal-
ysis it is centralized on the ability of market participants to ob-
serve the pending trading interests of other participants, or in 
other words, the content of the limit order book, and then of 
course the possibility to share the intention in a certain time, later 
or before.  
Knowledge about buying and selling, taking into account our in-
tention and others’ intentions, can be used both to refine one’s 
inference about the value of a security and to strategically plan 
the execution of a trading goal to minimize transaction costs. 
A lot of authors have tried to analyze these aspects but in any case 
no definitive answer has emerged, this is likely to be related to 
the heterogeneity of the markets around the world with different 
characteristics and ways to do trade. 
Generally, everyone accepts the concept of a better quality market 
in relation to transparency, but maintaining market transparency 
is problematic. Publicly available quote and trade data are cer-
tainly characteristics of transparent markets, but so too much data 
on trade size, their identity, order type, and the size and distribu-
tion of any limit orders, on the other side restricting the transpar-
ency debate to trade and quote data could report wide disparity in 
predicted effects. Past studies found that transparency matters be-
cause patterns in trades, such as imbalances of buying or selling 
orders across the market, may be more easily discerned in trans-
18 
 
parent markets. This allows market makers to learn any infor-
mation from trades more quickly, and thereby set their price more 
efficiently. 
There are a lot of important points to analyze and various hypoth-
esis to observe the transparency and the quality result in conse-
quence to its application; we generally expect that the transpar-
ency increase the informational efficiency and, as a consequence 
of that, the bid-ask spread decrease, which is an important ele-
ment to say that the efficiency of information is really strong. 
Transparency, as a consequence of what I mentioned previously, 
affect also the gain and loss of traders, the reduced ability of in-
formed traders to trade on their information in transparent mar-
kets should translate into lower rents for informed traders and 
higher rents for uninformed traders. There are also other points of 
view, for example the trading strategies of uninformed traders 
may differ between transparent and nontransparent settings, dic-
tating a complexity to predicting their actual trading rents in each 
setting. However, while greater informational efficiency dictates 
that the midpoint of the spread is closer to the true value, this does 
not necessarily mean that the spread is smaller. 
In relation to these aspects, the characteristics of the other traders 
in a specific market might be important. From an uninformed 
point of view it could be more effective a less transparent venue, 
as it facilitates their ability to hide the liquidity they need from 
the market. This reflects another problem related to the market 
quality, if a market maker knows that a large uninformed trader 
is buying this may set higher prices to take advantage of these 
trading needs12. 
 
                                                          
12 Roell 1990 
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1.3 Who benefits from transpar-
ency? Literature review 
 
In reference to the past studies we are not able to make a strong 
decision in relation to transparency, many times the research 
gives an ambiguous result and takes a position in relation to that 
is really difficult. However, I will try to explain the most interest-
ing studies taking from pro-research and con-research.  
De Frutos and Manzano in “Market transparency, market quality, 
and sunshine trading” have examined the effects disclosing infor-
mation about the price-insensitive component of the order flow 
on the market quality, analyzing first a fully transparent market 
and then a fully opaque market. 
For the tractability of the analysis, they focus the analysis on the 
symmetric linear rational expectation equilibrium (SLE), the re-
sults are the following:  
If there exist a SLE, then: 
𝜇 =
2𝑎
𝜌𝜎𝑣2(𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼)
?̅? −
𝑁 − 2
𝑁 − 1 𝛼
𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼
𝑧,̅ 
𝛽 =
𝛼
𝜌𝜎𝜖2
, 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝛾 =
𝛼
𝜌𝜎𝜖2
(1 +
2𝜎𝜖
2
(𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼)𝜎𝑣2
).                (1) 
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If there exists a SLE, α∈ (0, (N-2)/(N-1)). In addition, this coeffi-
cient is a root of a polynomial of third degree 𝑄(𝑎) = 𝑎𝛼3 +
𝑏𝛼2 + 𝑐𝛼 − 𝑑, whose coefficients are given by α = (ϕ +
1)(N − 1)2, b = (N − ϕ(N − 2))(N − 1), c = (N − 1)φ, and 
d = φ(N − 2), with ϕ=ρ2σɛ2σw2 and   φ= ρ2σɛ2σz2. When σz2≠0, 
there exists a unique SLE iff N≥3, on the other side when σz2=0, 
there exists a unique SLE iff N < (N − 2)ϕ. 
Under the opaque market σz2 >0, meanwhile in the transparent 
market σz2=0. Substituting this value in the equations above:  
A SLE in an opaque market exists iff N≥ 3. If it exists, then:                                                                                 
 
𝜇0 =
2𝛼0
𝜌(𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼0)𝜎𝑣2
?̅?,   (2)   
𝛽0 =
𝛼0
𝜌𝜎𝜖2
,  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝛾0 =
𝛼0
𝜌𝜎𝜖2
(1 +
2𝜎𝜖
2
(𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼0)𝜎𝑣2
),   (3) 
 
Where α0 is the unique real root belonging to (0, (N-2)/(N-1)) of 
the polynomial of degree three Q(α). 
A SLE in a transparent market exists iff N<(N-2)ϕ. If it exists, 
then: 
𝜇𝑇 = 𝜇0
𝑇 − 𝜇1
𝑇𝑧 =
2𝛼𝑇
𝜌(𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼𝑇)𝜎𝑣2
?̅? −
𝑁 − 2
𝑁 − 1 𝛼
𝑇
𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼𝑇
𝑧,  
𝛽𝑇 =
𝛼𝑇
𝜌𝜎𝑣2
,     (4) 
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And 
𝛾𝑇 =
𝛼𝑇
𝜌𝜎𝜖2
(1 +
2𝜎𝜖
2
(𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼𝑇)𝜎𝑣2
) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑇 = 𝜙(𝑁 − 2) − 𝑁)/((𝜙 + 1)(𝑁 − 1)). 
 
Using the expression of αT, it follows that the coefficient associ-
ated with z, i.e., -µ1
T, is equal to -1/(N+ϕ). The negativity of this 
coefficient indicates that in the transparent market, strategic trad-
ers place orders that partly accommodate the noise demand. 
Next the model analyzes the impact of transparency on the strate-
gic behavior of investors, as it influences the existence of equilib-
rium, as well as the price intercept and slope of trades’ demands.  
If a SLE exists for a transparent market, it exists also for the 
opaque market. The condition for existence in the former, N < (N-
2)ϕ, must meet N > 2 but, as N is natural number, then it requires 
N ≥3. The result is that trading is more robust in the opaque mar-
ket than in the transparent market (transparency may induce a 
form of market failure). 
Transparency has two main effects: firstly an increment in the 
price of the risk asset makes agents more optimistic about its liq-
uidation value, which leads to a smaller reduction in the individ-
ual demands as compared to the opaque market; secondly, de-
mands become less sensitive to traders’ liquidity shocks and pri-
vate signals. As a consequence of that, transparency in a market 
makes demands less sensitive to private information and anonym-
ity. 
Hence, transparency reduces endogenous liquidity trading mak-
ing less risk sharing (αT < αO), makes orders less responsive to 
private information about the liquidation value (βT < βO), and re-
duces demands’ price-responsiveness (γT < γO). 
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Even more interesting is the analysis in relation to market quality. 
The precision of the information taken by informed traders is very 
important on this point in this model is measured by var-1(ṽ|p,In), 
another important element is the informational content of the 
equilibrium price, which captures the information revealed by 
prices to uninformed traders, measured by var-1(ṽ|p). These two 
measures are measured at the time in which the trade is made and 
z is realized, if there is uncorrected transparency the informed 
traders take more precision from their private information.  
Prices are more informative in the transparent market iff the fol-
lowing inequality holds: 
𝛼0 <
𝛼𝑇
1 − 𝑁𝜇1
𝑇 =
(𝑁 + 𝜙)(𝜙(𝑁 − 2) − 𝑁)
𝜙(𝜙 + 1)(𝑁 − 1)
.               (5) 
 
Notice that from the expressions of the market clearing price, 
given by: 
𝜌0̃ =
1
𝑁𝛾0
(𝑁𝜇0 + 𝛽0 ∑ 𝑠?̃?
𝑁
𝑗=1
− 𝛼0 ∑ 𝑤?̃?
𝑁
𝑗=1
+ ?̃?)        (6) 
 
And 
 
𝑝𝑇 =
1
𝑁𝛾𝑇
(𝑁𝜇0
𝑇 + 𝛽𝑇 ∑ 𝑠?̃?
𝑁
𝑗=1
− 𝛼𝑇 ∑ 𝑤?̃? + (1 − 𝑁𝜇1
𝑇)?̃?
𝑁
𝑗=1
),   (7) 
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It follows that 
 
𝑣𝑎𝑟−1(?̃?|𝑝0) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟−1 (?̃? |
1
𝜌𝜎𝜖
2 ∑ 𝑠𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 +
𝑧
𝛼0
𝑁
𝑗=1 )   (8) 
 
And 
 
𝑣𝑎𝑟−1(?̃?|𝑝𝑇) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟−1 (?̃? |
1
𝜌𝜎𝜖2
∑ 𝑠𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑗=1
+
(1 − 𝑁𝜇1
𝑇)𝑧
𝛼𝑇
) (9) 
 
From these studies they derived that prices are more informative 
in the transparent market if αO<αT/(1-Nµ1T). 
The information given by the price is affected by transparency in 
a different way, first it reduces endogenous liquidity trading (αO> 
αT), hence the price is less informative; transparency also 
facilitates noise trading (µ1
T>0), leading prices to instances when 
transparency increases price revelation. 
If σz2 is small enough, then αO approaches αT making the first 
effect insignificant. As the second effect is independent of σz2 
transparency increases the informational content of prices. 
Similarly, if ϕ is large enough, then transparency increases the 
information given by the prices. The first effect is not very signif-
icant as αO- αT is small when ϕ is large. The second effect, despite 
being small as well, becomes the dominant one. 
Other aspects considered in order to measure the impact of 
transparency on market liquidity is to compare market depth in 
the two market structures. 
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 Market depth is given by: 
 
(
𝜕𝑝0
𝜕?̃?
)
−1
= 𝑁𝛾0        𝑎𝑛𝑑       (
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕?̃?
)
−1
=
𝑁𝛾𝑇
1 − 𝑁𝜇1
𝑇  .  (10)          
 
From the equation of Kyle(1989) where in a SLE the optimal de-
mand function for trader n is given by: 
 
𝑞𝑛(𝑝; 𝐼𝑛) =
𝐸(?̃?|𝑝, 𝐼𝑛) − 𝑝 − 𝜌𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃?|𝑝, 𝐼𝑛)𝑤𝑛
1
(𝑁 − 1)𝛾
+ 𝜌 𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃?|𝑝, 𝐼𝑛)
            (11) 
 
And the market clearing condition, it follows that 
𝑝 =
∑ 𝐸(?̃?|ℎ𝑛
𝑀, 𝑠𝑛) + (
1
(𝑁 − 1)𝛾𝑀
) 𝑧 + (𝑧 − ∑ 𝑤𝑛
𝑁
𝑗=1 )𝜌𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃?|ℎ𝑛
𝑀 , 𝑠𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1
𝑁
 (12) 
With 
 
ℎ𝑛
𝑀 = 𝛽𝑀 ∑ 𝑠𝑗 − 𝑎
𝑀 ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑗=𝑛
+ 𝛿{𝑀=0}𝑧,        𝑀 = 0, 𝑇         (13)
𝑗=𝑛
 
Noise trading affects market price through three aspects captured 
by three terms shown in the equation above: an adverse-selection 
effect, a strategic-behavior effect, and a risk-bearing effect. 
The adverse-selection effect is captured by the first term via hn
M. 
And increases in z increases hn
O without affecting hn
T. 
Speculator n can understand that an increment could be done 
through receiving favorable signals of his competitors about the 
payoff of the risk asset. As a consequence of that way of thinking, 
speculator adjusts his forecast upwards, which generates a price 
boost.  
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The strategic-behavior effect, the second term z/((N-1)NγM), 
measures the competitiveness of the market or its size via N, as 
well as price sensitivity of strategic traders’ demands. As in a 
transparent market traders are less price-sensitive, this effect is 
deeper in the transparent market. The market-clearing price in-
duces risk-averse speculators to trade (there is a risk-bearing ef-
fect). As speculators are better informed in the transparent mar-
ket, this third effect is more important in the opaque market. 
When N converges to infinity, the strategic-behavior effect van-
ishes. The equilibrium price is unambiguously more sensitive to 
changes in the noise demand in the opaque market. The transpar-
ent market is deeper. 
 Sufficient condition for obtaining a larger market depth in a 
transparent market are given by: 
 
𝜎𝜖
2(1 + 𝜙)
𝑁𝜎𝑣2
+ (1 − 𝜙
(𝑁2 − 4𝑁 + 2)
𝑁2
) < 0,                (14) 
 
This equation suggests that the comparison of the market liquidity 
between the two market structures is ambiguous and depends on 
the parameter specification. When σz2 is small enough, αO is close 
to αT, making γO-γT very small, so that transparency increases 
market depth. Regarding the sufficient condition in the proposi-
tion above, its intuition is less clear. When N converges to infin-
ity, it simplifies to 1<ϕ. This inequality coincides with the condi-
tion that guarantees the existence of the SLE in very competitive 
markets.  
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Thus, transparency increases market liquidity if the market is suf-
ficiently competitive. Also the analysis of liquidity is important, 
on the research DL, which represents the difference in liquidity 
between the two markets:  
𝐷𝐿 = (
𝜕𝑝0
𝜕?̃?
)
−1
− (
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕?̃?
)
−1
= 𝑁𝛾0 −
𝑁𝛾𝑇
1 − 𝑁𝜇1
𝑇 .      (15) 
 
The figure shows the difference in liquidity, DL, in terms of σz2 
for different value of N. The solid curve corresponds to N=10, the 
dashed one to N=20, and the dotted one to N=30. A negative value 
of DL indicates that the transparent market is deeper. In the limit 
when N goes to infinity, the transparent market is more liquid for 
all σz2. 
 
Figure 1 
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In order to analyze transparency, volatility is also crucial. It is 
measured by var(ṽ-pM). Straightforward computations yield: 
 
?̃? − 𝑝0 = ?̃? −
𝜇0
𝛾0
−
𝛽0
𝛾0
∑ ?̃?𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
+
𝛼0
𝛾0
∑ ?̃?𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
−
1
𝑁𝛾0
?̃?      (17) 
And 
?̃? − 𝑝𝑇 = ?̃? −
𝜇0
𝑇
𝛾𝑇
−
𝛽𝑇
𝛾𝑇
∑ ?̃?𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
+
𝛼𝑇
𝛾𝑇
∑ ?̃?𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
+
1 − 𝑁𝜇1
𝑇
𝑁𝛾𝑇
?̃?  (18) 
 
Therefore 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃? − 𝑝𝑀) = (𝜕
𝑝𝑀
𝜕?̃?
) 𝜎𝑧
2 + 𝑔(𝑎𝑀, 𝑟)             (19) 
 
With 
𝑔(𝛼𝑀, 𝑟) = (1 −
𝛽𝑀
𝛾𝑀
)
2
𝜎𝑣
2 + (
𝛽𝑀
𝑁𝛾𝑀
)
2
𝑁𝜎𝜖
2 + (
𝛼𝑀
𝑁𝛾𝑀
)
2
𝑁𝜎𝑊
2 ,    (20) 
  
Where r stands for the quotient σɛ2 /σv2. Substituting the values of 
the equilibrium coefficients, g(αM , r) simplifies to 
 
𝑔(𝛼𝑀, 𝑟) =
𝜎𝜖
2(4𝑁𝑟 + (𝜙 + 1)(𝑁 − 𝛼𝑀(𝑁 − 1))
2
)
𝑁(𝑁 − 𝛼𝑀(𝑁 − 1) + 2𝑟)2
          (21) 
 
To analyze the difference in price volatility, 
 
𝐷𝑉 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃? − 𝑝0) − 𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃? − 𝑝𝑇),               (22) 
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The model decomposes into two terms, DV1 and DV2, with 
 
𝐷𝑉1 = [(
𝜕𝑝0
𝜕?̃?
)
2
− (
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕?̃?
)
2
] 𝜎𝑧
2            (23) 
 
And 
 
𝐷𝑉2 = 𝑔(𝛼
0, 𝑟) − 𝑔(𝛼𝑇 , 𝑟).          (24) 
 
The term DV1, shows that the difference in price volatility stems 
from the difference in market liquidity, DL. There is also the pres-
ence of a second term DV2 that affects the difference in price vol-
atility by other factors.  
If DV2 vanishes or it is small enough, then:  
 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝐷𝑉) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 [(
𝜕𝑝0
𝜕?̃?
)
2
− (
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕?̃?
)
2
]
= −𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 [(
𝜕𝑝0
𝜕?̃?
)
−1
− (
𝜕𝑝𝑇
𝜕?̃?
)
−1
]     
= −𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝐷𝐿)                                 (25)          
 
 
There is an inverse relationship between price volatility and mar-
ket depth, this indicates that the mechanism with greater market 
price volatility provides the lower market depth. 
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Another set-up in which an inverse relationship between market 
depth and price volatility emerges in large markets, from the stud-
ies: 
 
lim
𝑛→∞
𝑣𝑎𝑟 (?̃? − 𝑝0) = lim
𝑛→∞
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̃? − 𝑝𝑇) = 0                             (26) 
 
Consequently 
 
                                               (27) 
 
The analytical derivation of sufficient conditions on the primi-
tives that guarantee a direct relationship between price volatility 
and market depth is not easy. For instance, if  
 
                                                                                                                    (28)
 
 
Hence, exist a unique value of σz2, say ?̃?z2 for which volatility and 
liquidity are aligned. 
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                                                   Figure 2 
                                                       
                                                   Figure 3 
 
 
The two figures above expose a particular case in which (27) 
holds. In figure 2, DL is showed in terms of c for N=10, ϕ=2, 
σɛ2=10, σv2= 0.5, and ρ=1. The result is ?̃?z2=3.052.Thus, when 
σz2<3.052, the transparent market is more liquid, whereas when 
σz2>3.052, the opaque is deeper.                                                                                                                                      
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Figure 3 represents DV as a function of σz2 for the parameter con-
figuration: N=10, ϕ=2, σɛ2=10, σv2= 0.5, and ρ=1. One can ob-
serve how for low values of σz2 (σz2<4.030), the price volatility is 
higher in the opaque market, whereas for σz2>4.030, the opposite 
holds true. Therefore when σz2∈(3.052, 4.030), the opaque market 
is both more liquid and volatile. 
                                                 
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 4A displays the differences in volatility in terms of σz2 for 
different values on N. The solid curve corresponds to N=10, the 
dashed one to N=20, and the dotted one to N=30 (as N increments 
the parameter configuration set in which the transparent market is 
less volatile for all σz2). 
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In fig. 4B, the analysis plot DV as a function of σz2 for different 
values of σv2. The solid line corresponds to σv2=0.5, the dashed 
one to σv2=1, and the dotted one to σv2=5. This figures shows that 
as σv2 increases, the parameter configuration set in which the 
transparent market is less volatile is higher. So, under the proper 
restriction, when σv2 goes to infinity, the transparent market is less 
volatile for all σz2, as a consequence we can say that there is an 
inverse relationship between market depth and price volatility. 
In large markets, transparency increases liquidity and reduces 
price volatility, whereas in small markets, the implications of 
market transparency depend on parameter specification. 
The principal conclusion is that a change in transparency, not al-
ways decreases the execution costs of liquidity traders. However, 
this analysis shows that transparency is beneficial for active secu-
rities, independently of the knowledge (public or not) traders have 
of their initial analysis. 
Continuing to look at the research of de Frutos and Manzano I 
think that it is still important to make clear the concept of trans-
parency, focusing more on the time of trading. The analysis “Risk 
Aversion, transparency and market performance” makes a right 
distinction for the time, a “pre-trade transparency refers to the 
wide dissemination of price quotations and orders before the 
trade, and a post-trade transparency refers to the public and timely 
transmission of information on past trades, including execution 
time, volume and price”13. The analysis is interesting because it 
shows that transparency on certain aspects could not influence 
market competitiveness. A fundamental aspect when we decide 
to study the trading market is related to forecasting, all the analy-
sis and all the studies are being carried out to see what could hap-
pen; traders and market makers have a strong interest in being 
able to forecast their transactions (good forecasts will lower car-
rying costs). Transparency simplifies the dealer’ task of obtaining 
                                                          
13 De Frutos, M.A., Manzano, C., 2002. Risk Aversion, Transparency and Mar-
ket Performance. Journal of Finance. SEC Market 2000 Study. 
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their planned order flow, because in this way, market subjects and 
in particular informed subjects are able to understand if a partic-
ular market is profitable or not and able to study profitable mar-
gins and quantity of the orders. 
If there is an opaque visibility, subjects are uncertain about the 
bid required to obtain more “favorable execution prices when 
markets are fragmented”. This research explains that liquidity 
may be bigger when markets are less transparent, given the fact 
that more noise can create more profit for dealers (more general 
for all the informed and specialist subjects). However, quotation 
transparency need not be beneficial either for investors or for 
dealers. Investor orders are executed at a better price in frag-
mented markets. “Dealers in fragmented markets face more com-
petition and tighter margins, but they can also enjoy lower inven-
tory carrying costs”.  
As I wrote before, the studies are focused on a centralized and 
fragmented market. A particularity of a centralized market is that, 
having a progressive auction, all dealers raise bid price and ask 
prices to their reservation levels, hence revealing their reservation 
prices. 
“In centralized markets, the optimal prices will be the second best 
reservation prices, regardless of the dealers’ attitudes towards 
risk”. Nevertheless, the optimal price depends on the risk attitude 
as reservation price depends upon them. In fragmented markets, 
dealers don’t know the intention of their competitors when they 
decide quotes. So we can say that fragmented markets are like 
markets functioning as a first price auction. 
The size of the market order is also clear in this analysis, the 
model determines the size of the public order into the two market 
structures considering the solution to the trading stage. “In frag-
mented market, the price effect dominates the risk effect, hence 
the risk aversion makes the market order size bigger. In central-
34 
 
ized market, the price effect is absent and there is only a risk ef-
fect. So this demonstration tells us that market liquidity is greater 
in the less pre-trade transparent market: Expected spreads are 
smaller and volume is higher. The model concludes saying that, 
ceteris paribus, all market participants strictly prefer to trade in 
fragmented markets”. 
From this analysis it is clear that fragmented market gives more 
price competition. The intuition is that at period one, the dealer 
has two reasons to offer better prices: risk aversion and the possi-
bility of exploiting the acquired information in subsequent trad-
ing. 
More practical analysis was made by Kyong, Park and Ok where 
thanks to the changes in the Korean market they were able to an-
alyze the effect of pre trade transparency. A change in pre-trade 
transparency has an effect on stock market quality through differ-
ent aspects. Each trade analyzing the possible true value of the 
stock decides the optimal strategies in direct response to the 
change in the quote disclosure and in response to the changes in 
the strategies of other agents. 
Generally the optimal level of transparency (pre-trade transpar-
ency) is chosen through a specific policy variable that can be 
freely set by an exchange or by regulators. The principal question 
in relation to actuate a specific level of transparency is to under-
stand how this application can improve market quality, however 
as we have seen before, there is no consensus that with an increase 
of a pre-trade transparency there is an improvement in market 
quality. This study is made thanks to a particular event on the Ko-
rea Exchange (KRX), an electronic order driven market. The 
KRX publicly discloses a specified number of the best buying and 
selling prices and the number of shares desired or offered at those 
prices. 
On March 6, 2000, the number of publicly disclosed prices (and 
the number of shares at each price) was increased from 3 to 5, and 
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from 5 to 10 on January 2, 2002. These two discrete changes in 
the disclosure policy allow to address the effect of pre-trade trans-
parency on market quality. The analysis of the two events is done 
by controlling volume and price using a panel data design. Using 
appropriate controls, they find evidence that market quality im-
proved following 2002 event; the evidence appears convincing 
using the OLS standard errors. They conclude that market quality 
is an increasing concave function of pre-trade transparency, with 
significantly decreasing returns to transparency above the level of 
disclosure established by 2000 event. The model is made with six 
annulled hypotheses on market stability and informational effi-
ciency of the price. Every hypothesis has the following basic 
structure: market quality is unchanged after the event compared 
to before the event. The model uses two methods: a standard 
event-study method, without controlling other relevant variables; 
and a panel-data analysis, controlling the endogenous variable 
volume and price.  
The model gives significant results: when it is correcting endog-
enous variable using a panel-data analysis, market quality im-
proves following both the 2000 and 2002 events, showing that 
market quality increases in pre-trade transparency; the conse-
quent improvement in market quality following the 2002 event is 
much more than following the 2000 event, this shows that market 
quality is a concave function of pre-trade transparency with sig-
nificantly diminishing returns above the level of disclosure estab-
lished by the 2000 event. 
This study analyzes 50 trading days before and after each of the 
2000 and 2002 events. 
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       Table 1 – the table reports descriptive statistics of the sample firms 
stratified into each of three groups (small, medium, and large firms) 
listed on the KRX. The groups are formed based on trading volume 
during the continuous trading session for each of the before-the-event 
sample periods. 
 
 
Figure 5 - The Korea Stock Price Index (KOSPI) from November 1999 to 
April 2002 
 
In Table 1, descripted statistics of the sample firms are divided 
into three groups: small, medium, and large firms. The total mar-
ket value of the 2000 (2002) sample firms is 107 (132) trillion 
won (approx. 103.9 (128.2) billion US dollar), consisting of 
36.6% (65.8%) of the total market value of all firms listed on the 
KRX at the end of 1999 (2001). The firms’ average market values 
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for the 2000 (2002) sample range from 43.2 (44.7) billion won to 
1,665.4 (1,119.7) billion won. The Table shows that, there is a 
slight decrease in trading volume (for both periods) first and after 
the event. The prices decrease around the 2000 event, while they 
increase around the 2002. The market trend confirms what is writ-
ten in table 1(Fig.5). This analysis indicates that both events im-
proved market quality and it concludes that market microstructure 
event studies should use panel-data analysis to check for relevant 
endogenous variables to ensure the efficiency of their results. 
Comparing the anonymous and fully transparent regimes it shows 
that the effect of transparency on liquidity is influenced by two 
elements: endogenous entry and traders’ strategic behavior. The 
model shows that transparency enhances liquidity, however, 
when the authors allow for endogenous acquisition it finds that 
transparency reduces liquidity. The reason for this result is that 
when uninformed traders observe the insiders’ demand, they 
englobe a signal on the liquidation value of the asset, which is a 
distort vision (noisy) of the insiders’ private information: as a 
consequence they behave almost as if they were insiders. Since 
informed agents pay lower adverse selection costs than unin-
formed ones, they provide liquidity at lower costs. Hence, when 
uninformed traders have more information about the liquidation 
value of the asset, liquidity increases. In other words, transpar-
ency reduces adverse selection costs for uninformed traders and 
motivates them to offer liquidity. This result, that is standard in 
precious literature on the market transparency, is reversed with 
endogenous entry of informed agents: transparency allows unin-
formed traders to learn information from other traders’ net de-
mands and this reduces their adverse selection costs14.  
When agents have a strategy, they are concerned about price im-
pact of their trade and this reduce the liquidity.  
                                                          
14 Rindi, B., 2002. Informed traders as liquidity providers: anonymity, liquidity 
and price formation. Review of Finance. 
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When agents are competitive, transparency increases liquidity; 
the adverse selection costs are reduced when there is transpar-
ency. On the other hand, when allowing for endogenous infor-
mation acquisition, the equilibrium number of insiders and liquid-
ity are lower (under the fully transparent regime). “Informed 
agents, who pay the least adverse selection costs, are the best li-
quidity suppliers”: since transparency reduces the incentive to 
buy information it reduces market depth and reduces the number 
of informed traders who want to enter in the market. Transpar-
ency is the best ally for informational efficiency and volatility. 
 
1.4 Anonymous traders and Insider 
trading phenomenon 
 
Anonymously and insider effects are strictly related to our analy-
sis and it is good to make some considerations in relation to these 
phenomenon. 
The principal question is what happens when people with differ-
ent information decide to trade. How market prices are affected 
by agents’ information affects how the traders can infer infor-
mation from market prices. The fundamental insight is that prices 
serve two purposes: they clear markets and they aggregate infor-
mation. This dual role makes the behavior of prices and markets 
much more complex than that assumed in the standard asset pric-
ing paradigm. 
The reason why these two phenomenon exist in the financial mar-
ket is because of the tendency of the trader to make the optimal 
habitat to make profit, in particular these two phenomenon could 
be very profitable for informed traders. Informed traders acquire 
and act on information about fundamental instrumental value. 
They trade when they believe that prices differ from fundamental 
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values. They buy when they believe that prices are below funda-
mental values, and they sell when they believe that prices are 
above fundamental values. Informed traders differ by how they 
form and act upon their opinions about fundamental values. Value 
traders estimate fundamental values by collecting and analyzing 
all available information. News traders are the first to trade on 
new information. Information-oriented technical traders identify 
systematic patterns which indicate that price differs from their 
fundamental values. Arbitrageurs compare fundamental values 
across instruments. All these informed traders prefer to work on 
an anonymous market, given the fact that in this way their profits 
are higher, meanwhile when the information is shared the price 
moves faster to the fundamental value and their profits are lower. 
On the purpose of anonymity, a good analysis was made by 
Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica, where it focused on the im-
pact of limit order anonymity on liquidity in Paris, Tokyo and 
Korean markets. The paper examines the impact of changes on 
the anonymity of limit orders on Euronext Paris, TSE and KSE 
on April 23, 2001, June 30, 2003 and October 25, 1999, respec-
tively. This study shows that the removal of broker identifiers had 
a significant impact on liquidity, attached to limit order on Euron-
ext Paris and TSE. As a result, the increase in anonymity pro-
vokes a decrease in relative bid-ask spreads and effective spreads 
of orders. This means that the introduction of anonymous limit 
orders improves market quality. Even in this paper a decrease in 
the anonymity on the KSE provokes a decline in liquidity. An im-
portant implication of these findings is that information pertain-
ing to broker identification provides information to market par-
ticipants about the nature of the order flow displayed in the order 
book. 
Anonymity is strongly interconnected with the insider phenome-
non. Traders engage in insider trading when they base their trades 
on material information about the value of an instrument that is 
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not publicly available. Most insider trading involves private in-
formation that corporate managers know about the prospect of 
their companies. 
Insider trading also may involve information that traders improp-
erly obtain from other sources. In most countries, insider trading 
is illegal and punishable by fines or imprisonment. Insider trading 
laws are very difficult to enforce, however. At the beginning of 
the phenomenon, only few countries decided to restrict the act, 
the United States, Canada, and Great Britain were the first to at-
tempt to enforce their insider-trading laws. 
Insider trading has many economic effects. In the financial mar-
kets, it affects investor confidence, price efficiency, and liquidity. 
From a macroeconomic aspect, insider trading affects the labor 
market for senior corporate managers, and the quality of the man-
agement decisions that these executives make. 
Insider information is not available information about the value 
of a security. This particular information is information that 
would cause a change of price if it were widely known. Fighting 
insider-trading is quite difficult, rarely insiders trade on their in-
formation themselves because they know it is illegal, therefore, 
they give their information to confederates who trade on their be-
half. Identifying who is trading on insider information however is 
often impossible. For the stock exchange in the United States, 
there’s a market surveillance department that monitors its markets 
for trading irregularities. The surveillance officers look for suspi-
cious events. When they identify unusual trading, they conse-
quently try to determine whether a recent release of public infor-
mation would explain it. If they cannot find an obvious explana-
tion, they call the listed firm and ask whether they are aware of 
information that could have caused the price change. When the 
surveillance officers understand that the firm will soon change 
significantly in some aspect not yet public, they may suspect in-
sider trading. 
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In general, large price changes associated with high volumes that 
occur before releases of significant unexpected news often indi-
cate that insiders or their confederates were trading. In order to 
analyze the insider trading phenomenon there are a lot of argu-
ments in favor and against restricting insider trading. 
People that are against insider trading believe that effective re-
strictions on insider trading increase investor confidence, lower 
transaction cost, and solve corporate control problems which arise 
when insiders can trade on inside information. On the other hand, 
the main arguments for unrestricted insider trading involve price 
efficiency, the costs of enforcement, and incentives for entrepre-
neurial behavior by managers. 
The law of insider trading is one way society allocates the prop-
erty rights to information produced by a firm. In the United States, 
early common law permitted insiders to trade in a firm’s stock 
without disclosure of inside information. The U.S. trend was fol-
lowed by other countries gradually, although enforcement levels 
continue to vary substantially from country to country15. When 
we talk of insider trading phenomenon, there are two different 
point of view: people that are in favor of a deregulation of insider 
trading and people that are opposed. Those in favor of regulating 
insider trading typically reject the fact that efficiency is the con-
trolling criterion or attempts to show that the prohibition is justi-
fiable on good reason. Examining the literature closely it is hard 
to understand what is better, but the reasons in favor of regulation 
are probably stronger at the moment. 
In large corporations insider trading could be assumed as an al-
ternative compensation for entrepreneurs. The firm and the man-
ager could improve profit and benefits knowing what the manager 
will do and what his abilities are. In contrast, an entrepreneur’s 
contribution to the firm consists of producing new value, and new 
                                                          
15 Bainbridge, S.M., 1998. Insider trading: An Overview. UCLA School of Law. 
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value most of the time is information. The entrepreneur’s com-
pensation must have a reasonable relation to the value of his con-
tribution to give him incentives to produce more information16. 
Insider trading can be used from some managers when they are 
not satisfied of their salary, in this way they can try to make more 
profit through the market. “Some of those who favor deregulating 
insider trading deny that the property rights of firms to infor-
mation produced by their agents include the right to that infor-
mation. In contrast, those who favor regulation contend that when 
an agent produces information the property right to that infor-
mation belongs to the principal” (Bainbridge, 1998). People that 
argued in favor of insider trading said that if manager are able to 
trade with insider information they have interest to maintain the 
stock price stable and also to move the price to the better direction 
for their profits. These goal are obtained using “manipulative 
price”. 
Insider trading is difficult to detect and, moreover, centralized 
monitoring of insider trading by the SEC and the self-regulatory 
organizations within the securities industry may be more efficient 
than private party efforts to detect insider trading17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Bainbridge, S.M., 1998. Insider trading: An Overview. UCLA School of Law. 
17 Macey (1991, p.40-41) 
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2 Sunshine Trading 
In recent years, much attention has been focused on the liquidity 
of financial markets, especially following the critical crash that 
hit the markets over the last few years. 
Some have suggested that liquidity would be enhanced if traders 
engaged in “sunshine trading”. A trader who follows a sunshine 
trading strategy preannounces to the other traders in the market 
that he will trade a specific number of shares or contracts several 
hours (or perhaps longer) before the order is actually submitted.  
Despite several studies and traders sharing opinion that sunshine 
trading could be a real solution for the great number of problems 
affecting the trading market, principally related to the informa-
tiveness, sometimes it could be a strategy not so efficient given 
the fact that to support a strategy like that, there should be some 
optimal conditions that in some markets are not realistically pos-
sible. Anyway, it could be useful to analyze the characteristic of 
this way of trading in order to understand if there could be a pos-
sible solution or a possible starting point from which to develop 
a new and efficient market, not only from the traders’ point of 
view but also from the market point of view. 
To document knowledge sunshine trading was first undertaken 
(on a limited and informal basis) by the portfolio insurance firm 
of Leland, O’Brien and Rubinstein (LOR)18. 
Sunshine trading must be formally distinguished from “prear-
rangement trading”, which is illegal.  
 
 
                                                          
18 Kidder, Peabody & Co. (1986). 
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2.1 What is Sunshine Trading? 
 
Sunshine trading refers to traders who announce to the market 
who they are, what they intend to do, the full extent of their or-
ders, and why they intend to trade. Sunshine trading works well 
when sunshine traders are well known and are known to be unin-
formed and honest. In large markets, sunshine trading at best 
works only for the largest traders, since only those traders will be 
able to acquire credible reputation. 
The strategy of Sunshine trading does not work if traders suspect 
that the sunshine trader may be well informed or dishonest. If 
traders could always obtain more liquidity merely by revealing 
their identities, all traders would do so. Unknown informed trad-
ers would pretend to be uninformed traders, and well known in-
formed traders would create new identities to mask their trading. 
Well-informed traders who try to pass for uninformed traders are 
wolves in sheep’s clothing. Sunshine trading generally does not 
work well because it is hard to determine whether sunshine trad-
ers are indeed uninformed traders and whether they have indeed 
revealed their entire trading interests19.  
Good answers to such questions generally require thorough in-
vestigation on exchange floors or in screen-based trading sys-
tems. 
Although sunshine trading may solve the asymmetric information 
problem for some very well-known traders, it introduces another 
serious problem. By revealing their intended trades, sunshine 
traders give free trading options to the market. They therefore at-
tract front runners, quote matchers, and, under some circum-
stances, squeezers.  
Sunshine traders may therefore have higher transaction costs than 
they if controlled their order exposure more carefully. 
                                                          
19 Trading Exchanges, Larry Harris 2003. 
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2.2 Analysis of past studies 
 
Past studies carried out on the concept of sunshine trading are 
principally related to the analysis analysis made by Admati 
(1986) and Pfleiderer (1984). All other researchers make their 
consideration about sunshine trading using these topics as a start-
ing point. 
We have to consider the possibility that some liquidity traders 
preannounce the size of their orders (sunshine trading). When a 
trader decides to make a preannouncement there are two possible 
effects: one is that since it identifies certain trades as information-
less, preannouncement changes the nature of any informational 
asymmetries in the market; another aspect is that preannounce-
ment can coordinate the supply and demand of liquidity in the 
market.              
Two important aspects to analyze when we talk about the prean-
nouncement are the coordination of the supply demand of liquid-
ity; in fact, when potential traders are informed about personal 
decisions and principally the traders who can take the other side 
of the preannounced orders could prepare themselves and the 
market to absorb the orders preannounced. This facilitates the 
match between demand and supply of liquidity in the market20. 
Preannouncement also has another important implication, the 
identification of informationless, which could lower the price im-
pact of the order. 
 Identification of informationless trades have some implications, 
preannouncement has been used by such traders as index fund 
managers and portfolio insurers, whose trading motives are not 
based on private information. If used only by such traders, the 
preannouncement of an order would identify it as uninformative, 
                                                          
20 Grossman (1988) 
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which would typically change its price impact as well as the im-
pact of other orders. 
Important studies were made by Admati (1986) this study was 
focused on three types of traders: risk-averse speculators, which 
are the ones who absorb the liquidity shocks of other traders; po-
tential sunshine traders, called announcers; and no announcers, 
that do not preannounce in any case. The model is based on a 
standard normal exponential rational expectation model and it 
isolates two effects of preannouncement. One is due to the as-
sumption that preannounced orders come from traders who do not 
have private information. 
This implies that preannouncement leads to a decrease in the total 
expected trading cost of liquidity traders, even though it leads to 
an increase in the expected trading cost of liquidity traders who 
cannot preannounce. 
An interesting element of the preannouncement is that the saving 
in liquidity traders’ expected trading costs are enough to compen-
sate speculators for any losses they might suffer due to prean-
nouncement. The model also shows that, if there is no private in-
formation and, at the same time, liquidity provides (speculators) 
incurs in a cost in order to trade in the risk asset, preannounce-
ment can serve as a mechanism for coordinating the entry of spec-
ulators into the market.  
The implication of this analysis for the preannouncement is that 
expected trading costs of the announcers are strictly lower when 
announcement takes place compared to when it does not; the ex-
pected trading costs of the no announcers are strictly higher when 
preannouncement takes place rather than when it does not and 
preannouncement strictly lowers the ex-ante expected utility of 
speculators.  
With the preannouncement the total expected trading costs of all 
liquidity traders are lower, and these savings are higher than the 
welfare losses of the speculators as measured by the difference in 
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the certainty equivalents of their surplus with and without prean-
nouncement.  
On the other hand, the ex-ante expected utility of speculators is 
increased with preannouncement. Concerning the price behavior 
the model shows that the identification of liquidity orders means 
that preannouncement increases the informativeness of the price 
and reduces the variance of the price change. As a consequence 
of this aspect we also suppose that preannouncement leads to a 
decrease in price variability if entry by speculators is costly. The 
preannouncement strategy is principally used by certain institu-
tional traders who want to trade for reasons other than privately 
held (payoff relevant information). The concept of liquidity trad-
ers and the fact that we have to assume all the announcers as li-
quidity traders is crucial.21      
Looking at the entry costs of speculators the model shows how 
significant different effects are present. For this topic the model 
shows that preannouncement would tend to reduce the variance 
of trading costs. This is in addition to the decrease in expected 
trading costs brought about by preannouncement. 
Another interesting analysis of sunshine trading is also made by 
de Frutos and Manzano (2002) in “Market transparency, market 
quality and sunshine trading” that we have seen also in the anal-
ysis of market transparency. 
The studies are focalized on the possibility that traders voluntarily 
preannounce the size of their orders to the other market partici-
pants. Generally noise traders decide whether or not to announce 
their order sizes and when trading takes place. 
 The model presents the solution by backward induction and as-
suming that the number of noise traders who preannounce is 
                                                          
21 A lot of reason make to believe that this assumption is reasonable or that, 
the preannounced order is most likely not to be based on private infor-
mation.(Gennotte and Leland 1990). 
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fixed. Formally, supposing that noise demand comes from H li-
quidity traders, indexed by h=1,…,H. Thus, 𝑧 ̃=∑ 𝑧 ̃𝐻ℎ h   where 𝑧 ̃ 
denotes the demand for noise trader h.  
Let 𝑧 ̃, h=1,…,H, be i.i.d. with 𝑧 ̃~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑧  
2 /H). 
The model assumes two types of liquidity traders: announcers 
(noise traders who preannounce the size of their trades) and non-
announcers (who do not preannounce the size of their trades). 
Let A denote the subset of liquidity traders who are announcers. 
Formally, 
 
𝐴 = {ℎ ∈ {1, … , 𝐻} 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 ℎ 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟} 
 
HA represents the cardinality of this set (0≤ HA ≤ H) and zA de-
notes the realization of the aggregate demand of announcers, i.e., 
zA = ∑ 𝑧ℎ∈𝐴 h. Notice that HA = 0 corresponds to a framework sim-
ilar to the opaque mechanism (see the market transparency sec-
tion), whereas HA = H models a setup analogous to the transparent 
market.  
Therefore, for intermediate values of HA, the model derives the 
result: 
When 0< HA<H. A SLE exists iff N≥3. If it exists, then:  
 
𝜇 = 𝜇0 − 𝜇1𝑧𝐴 =
2𝛼
𝜌𝜎𝑣2(𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼)
?̅? −
𝑁 − 2
𝑁 − 1 − 𝛼
𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼
𝑧𝐴, 
𝛽 =
𝛼
𝜌𝜎𝜖2
      (19) 
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And 
𝛾 =
𝛼
𝜌𝜎𝜖2
(1 +
2𝜎𝜖
2
(𝑁 − (𝑁 − 1)𝛼)𝜎𝑣2
)            (20) 
 
Where α is the unique real root belonging to (0,(N-2)/(N-1)) of 
the polynomial of degree three Q(α), with φ=((H-HA/H)ρ2σɛ2σz2. 
We can note the number of announcers have a strong influence 
on the equilibrium coefficients. Then, to emphasize this fact, the 
equilibrium coefficients are written as γ and µ1 as γ(HA) and 
µ1(HA). 
The model is focusing on the first stage of the game and it studies 
the incentives for noise traders to engage in sunshine trading. It 
assumes that noise traders take this decision by comparing their 
conditional expected trading costs. 
CNA(zh,HA) and C
A(zh,HA) represent the expected trading costs of 
a no announcer and announcer, conditional on their trade size zh, 
when there are HA announcers. 
We can say that the noise trader h is willing to preannounce his 
trade size when 
 
𝐶𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 𝐻𝐴 + 1) < 𝐶
𝑁𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 𝐻𝐴)                  (21) 
 
If the above equation holds for HA =0,…,H-1, and for all zh, 
h=1,…,H, then an equilibrium exists in which all the noise traders 
decide to engage in sunshine trading. 
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Direct computations yield 
𝐶𝑁𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 𝐻𝐴) =
1
𝑁𝛾(𝐻𝐴)
𝑧ℎ
2                              (22) 
And 
𝐶𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 𝐻𝐴) =
1 − 𝑁𝜇1(𝐻𝐴)
𝑁𝛾(𝐻𝐴)
𝑧ℎ
2                      (23) 
 
From this equilibrium analysis we can observe the results making 
some considerations: 
Firstly, the conditional expected profits of a noise trader are lower 
if he is announcer, whenever zh≠0; when noise traders have a 
higher liquidity they prefer to use sunshine trading and when a 
noise trader decides to make some preannouncements it is inde-
pendent from the order size he wants to trade. 
This last concept is really important because we can derive that 
when a noise trader has already preannounced his order he does 
not regret his decision also if he observes that other noise traders 
also display their orders. 
Supposing that zh≠0 the model notes that:  
CA(zh,HA+1)<CAN(zh,HA)  
Iff  
(1-N𝜇1(HA+1))/(Nγ(HA+1))<1/(Nγ(HA)). 
From this inequality we can see how there are two opposite ef-
fects on conditional expected trading costs: it reduces the price 
responsiveness of traders’ demands (γ(HA+1)<γ(HA))22, and, it fa-
cilitates that the order is partly accommodated (𝜇1(HA+1)>0), 
                                                          
22 The intuition of this fact is as follows. Notice that the degree of market 
transparency increases with the number of announcers. Then, in a market 
with more announcers, an increase in the price of the risky asset makes 
agents more 
optimistic about its liquidation value, which leads to a smaller reduction in 
the individual demands, as compared to a 
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leading to lower conditional expected trading costs. At the end 
when there is a domination of the second effect the noise trader h 
will want to become an announcer.  
When CA(zh,HA) is decreasing (this is verified when ϕ is high 
enough), as CA(zh,HA)<C
NA (zh,HA) for all HA and zh≠0, it holds 
that 
 
𝐶𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 𝐻) < 𝐶
𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 𝐻 − 1) < ⋯ < 𝐶
𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 1) < 𝐶
𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 0)
< 𝐶𝑁𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 0) < 𝐶
𝑁𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 1) < ⋯
< 𝐶𝑁𝐴(𝑧ℎ, 𝐻)    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑧ℎ ≠ 0           (24) 
 
On this condition (21) holds and there is an equilibrium in which 
all the noise traders whose size order is not null preannounce. 
(24) is a sufficient condition for the existence of this sort of equi-
librium. 
A weaker condition that can also guarantee its existence is given 
by Max HA∈(0,..,H-1) CA(zh,HA+1)<CAN (zh,0) for all zh≠0, 
h=1,…,H.  
From the studies there is the consideration that other types of 
equilibria can exist. For instance, if a value of HA exists such that 
(21) does not hold, then there is an equilibrium in which ?̂?A some 
noise traders decide to preannounce and the remainder does not, 
where ?̂?A denotes the lowest HA such that (21) does not hold. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Market with fewer announcers. 
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The two examples illustrate the aforementioned types of equilib-
ria. 
Example 1. H=2, z1=10, z2=10, N=10, ϕ=3, 𝜎𝜀
2=10, 𝜎𝑣
2=10, ρ=1, 
𝜎𝑧
2=10.
 
Figure 1 Conditional expected trading costs in terms of HA (with the 
parameter configuration stated in Example 1) 
 
Fig. 1 shows how the graph of the function CNA (zh,HA) (solid 
curve) is located above the graph of the function CA(zh,HA+1) 
(dotted curve). This implies that there is an equilibrium in which 
one noise trader preannounces and the other noise trader does not. 
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Example 2. H=2, z1=10, z2=10, N=4, ϕ=3, 𝜎𝜀
2=10, 𝜎𝑣
2=10, ρ=1, 
𝜎𝑧
2=10 
Figure 2 Conditional expected trading costs in terms of HA (with the 
parameter configuration stated in Example 2). 
 
Fig. 2 shows how the graph of the function CNA(zh,HA) (solid 
curve) and the graph of the function CA(zh,HA+1) (dotted curve) 
intersect in a point. This implies that there is an equilibrium in 
which all the noise traders preannounce.  
In large markets (N or H is enough), all the noise traders (whose 
order sizes are not null) decide to preannounce their order size. 
As considerations we can say that in large markets the action of a 
noise trader has a negligible impact on the economy. Principally 
it is observed that in this case α(HA+1) is very close to α(HA), 
making γ(HA+1)-γ(HA) very small, for this reason the first effect 
of preannouncement has little relevance. However, the second ef-
fect dominates and, consequently, all the noise traders (whose or-
der size is not null) wish to become announcers. 
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To conclude the journey through the past studies on sunshine trad-
ing I think it is necessary to make an analysis of a real study on a 
real trading market. 
In the studies of emerging markets made by Dia and Pouget 
(2011) some observations are really interesting, principally be-
cause they question how liquidity is formed in emerging financial 
markets and studying liquidity formation of infrequently traded 
stocks and the role of preopening periods in the formation of li-
quidity. 
Infrequent trading is a widespread feature of the stock market. 
One important element to understand these aspects are strictly re-
lated to the turnover percentage of these markets. Infrequent trad-
ing is more preannounced in African stock markets where the 
turnover in Sub-Saharan countries did not exceed 10% of the cap-
italization in 199523. 
In a market like this it is really hard to understand the liquidity 
formation principally for market designers who would like to pro-
mote trading, and for traders whose profits largely depend on ex-
ecution quality. The two principal aspects of market imperfec-
tions are the asymmetric information and the costly market par-
ticipation and in this particular type of market these problems are 
present, hence some trading arrangements and market organiza-
tions can mitigate the impact of these two factors. 
Sunshine trading with his transparent strategies can be a solution 
for this kind of problems thanks to the fact it can improve the 
coordination between demand and supply of liquidity. A certain 
period of preopening market announcing associated with a long-
term relationship among market participants can constitute an ef-
fective and credible way to implement sunshine trading24. 
                                                          
23 Kenny and Moss (1998). 
24 Dia and Pouget (2010). 
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As mentioned previously Dia and Pouget use data from the West 
African Bourse. This stock market, given its peculiarity, repre-
sents an ideal scenario to empirically identify sunshine trading. 
The West African Bourse includes a preopening period; partici-
pation in the West African Bourse is likely to be costly for inter-
national investors who are the major liquidity providers in Afri-
can stock markets; only a small number of broker-dealers can sub-
mit orders to the market and these orders are not anonymous. The 
West African Bourse thus offers an ideal venue for the develop-
ment of long-term relationships necessary for the credibility of 
sunshine trading and also the West African Bourse includes a pre-
opening period before the daily call market. During this preopen-
ing period, tentative prices and volumes are computed but no 
transaction occurs. This preopening period is transparent: tenta-
tive prices and volumes are publicly disseminated among market 
participants. Such a preopening period thus offers a mechanism 
through which market participants can communicate to others 
their willingness to trade. 
In this market the practice of sunshine trading seems to give more 
chance to traders with high liquidity that want to attract liquidity 
providers. The results on this study indicate that there is a latent 
liquidity that is not reflected in the order book because of the mar-
ket participation cost, and that is realized only when traders en-
gage in sunshine trading.  
The Data of the analysis includes all the orders submitted to the 
market from January 3rd, 2000 to December 13th, 2000. This cor-
responds to 141 trading sessions. For each session, they computed 
the indicative prices, the market clearing price, and the quantities 
allocated to each broker-dealer. Among the 40 stocks listed on the 
Bourse, they focused on the stocks that were included in the index 
of the Bourse.  
For each stock in the model several descriptive statistics are re-
ported for the year 2000 including the average and standard devi-
ation of the volume per trading session, the average number of 
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orders per trading session and the turnover defined as the total 
number of shares traded over the number of outstanding shares. 
As we can simply assume for this kind of market the volume per 
trading session, and the number of orders submitted to the market 
are on average quite low. 
For this reason the turnover for this market is also low making the 
market kind of inactive, in fact, all the broker-dealers are not 
providing liquidity at every trading session. From this considera-
tion it is simple to make the conclusion that this bourse is an oli-
gopoly market, this is a common element for all the markets that 
have low volume stocks. Interesting data is given from the aver-
age transaction cost that is really high with respect to the average 
of the other markets around the world, they represent from 2.6% 
to 16.4% of the transaction price for a one hundred-share order 
with an average equal to 6.8%. 
For all the stocks selected for the analysis the trading volume ap-
pears highly volatile while the prices are surprisingly stable. 
These features indicate that the market is punctually able to ac-
commodate huge transactions without major price adjustments. 
Starting from these impressions they perform the following re-
gressions. For each stock, they regress the absolute returns from 
the last trading sessions (a measure of the price volatility) onto 
the contemporaneous trading volume. 
The estimated equation is: 
 
|𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1|
𝑃𝑡−1
= 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑄𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                             (25) 
 
In the equation t is the time expressed in terms of trading sessions 
with a non-null trading volume. Pt is the transaction price in CFA 
francs, and Qt is the trading volume in shares at time t. The result 
for the coefficient b appears not significantly different from zero 
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for the stock selected for the analysis and at the same time, the 
regression R²s are extremely low. The model didn’t reject the hy-
pothesis that trading volume has no impact on prices, and in par-
ticular that high volumes do not destabilize prices. The results of 
the analysis carried out by the authors can be seen slightly 
strangely because, generally one would expect a thin market to 
generate high execution costs. 
If sunshine trading is successful on the Bourse, a significant part 
of the orders placed early should be eventually executed. Tables 
1 and 2 address these issues. 
 
Table 1 – Distribution of orders according to their size and their time 
of placement during the preopening period. (Source: see Footnote 30). 
For each of the stocks selected, orders are classified in sixteen catego-
ries according to the placement time quartile and the size quartile they 
belong to. Table 5 averages these data. The upper-left cell of the table 
represents the large orders placed early. The first quartile of placement 
time is on average 9:16 am. The second quartile of placement time is 
on average 9:39 am. The third quartile of placement time is on average 
10:07 am. The first quartile of order size is on average 9 shares. The 
second quartile is on average 32 shares. The third quartile of order size 
is on average 92 shares. 
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Table 2 – Proportion of orders executed at the call as a function of their 
size and placement time during the preopening period. (Source: see 
Footnote 30). For each size and time category, this table reports the 
proportion of orders (partially) filled at the time of the call averaged 
across the selected stocks. 
 
These two dimension tables classify the size and the time of 
placement during the preopening period. Each dimension is di-
vided in four quartiles, creating a 16-cell table. The upper-left cell 
includes the orders pertaining to the fourth quartile in terms of 
size, and to the first quartile in terms of placement time. This cell 
thus includes the large orders that are placed early during the pre-
opening period. Table 1 presents the average proportion of orders 
of various sizes placed during the four intervals of the preopening 
period. 
Generally sunshine trading is frequent when large quantities are 
verified, the authors decided to focus the analysis on the 4th and 
3rd size quartiles because the most favorable characteristic is ver-
ified. 
Table 1 can give the possibility to compute the proportion of large 
orders placed in the first part of the preopening period; the pro-
portions are 50% and 56% for the 4th and 3rd size quartiles re-
spectively. So we can easily assume that during the preopening 
period the large orders are quite often the majority of the orders. 
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Table 2 indicates for each order size and each placement time the 
proportion of orders that have been filled at the time of the call in 
order to verify that large orders are not made for market manipu-
lation, then it results that 28% of the large orders placed early (4th 
and 3rd size quartiles, and 1st and 2nd time quartiles) are on av-
erage executed concluding that the biggest part of orders are “in 
the market”. 
A characteristic of the West African Bourse is that the most in-
tense activity is made before the time of the call, this indicates 
that when broker-dealers want to exchange large quantities of 
shares, they place large orders early during the preopening period. 
In my personal opinion when we are in a contest like this and we 
have to assume all these characteristics of a market probably the 
choice of using sunshine trading is the only real successful option 
for people that want to make large orders and logically, if we ob-
serve a market so restricted with a sunshine trading strategy we 
can attract potential liquidity providers. 
Therefore, when implementing sunshine trading with limit orders 
agents choose to preannounce prices at which they stand ready to 
trade. This of course is important to make an analysis to under-
stand the relation between first tentative of trading and the trans-
action price in order to see if the strategy is optimal or not; then 
to clarify this issue, the model analyzes the returns with an OLS 
regression analysis. 
Consequently, for each stock the OLS is made by the following 
equation: 
 
𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
= 𝐴1 + 𝐵1 ∗
𝐼𝑃𝑡
1 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
+ 𝐸𝑡
1                     (26) 
 
Where 𝐼𝑃𝑡
1 represents the average indicative price during the first 
part of the preopening period. The results are in Table 3. 
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Table 3 – Price discovery regressions (Source: see Footnote 30). This 
table presents the result of OLS regression of the returns from the pre-
vious trading session to the call onto the returns from the previous trad-
ing session to the first part of the preopening period. The return at date 
t is computed as the difference between the price at date t and the price 
at date t-1, divided by the price at date t-1. Only the days with a non-
null trading volume are considered. The number of observations are 
consequently not the same for all the stocks. The data is conditional on 
the existence of indicative prices in the first part of the preopening pe-
riod. This further reduces the number of observations. P-values are re-
ported in parenthesis. 
 
Indicative prices taking into account what is explained above is 
clear that the power of the information computed and announced 
during the first part of the preopening period are very good data, 
and for this reason looking at early indicative prices, broker-deal-
ers can have a relatively accurate idea of the price that will prevail 
on the market. Given this implication and the fact that no transac-
tion occurs during the preopening period, the informational con-
tent of indicative prices in terms of fundamental valuation could 
be questioned. 
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In the context of sunshine trading, this issue becomes crucial 
since pre announcers are big participants and may try to manipu-
late market prices, but, it is also true that information revelation 
during the preopening period might be beneficial to the traders 
since it relaxes the participation constraint of the outsider.  
To better understand the importance of the information that could 
have been related it is important to analyze the return between the 
previous trading session and the next trading session that can be 
predicted thorough the return between the previous trading ses-
sion and the preopening period25.  
The model uses OLS regressions to estimate the following equa-
tion: 
 
𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
= 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 ∗
𝐼𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
+ 𝜖𝑡
1                         (27) 
 
To obtain a measure of the total information that could have been 
revealed during the preopening period, we also ran these regres-
sions with the call price Pt instead of the mean early indicative 
price 𝐼𝑃𝑡
1 . The estimated equation was: 
 
𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗
𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
+ 𝜖𝑡
1                  (28) 
 
The results are in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999) 
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Table 4 – Information revealed by indicative prices 
This table presents the result of OLS regression of the returns from the previous 
trading session to the next trading session onto the returns from the previous 
trading session to the first part of the preopening period. The return at date t is 
computed as the difference between the price at date t and the price at date t-1, 
divided by the price at date t-1. Only the days with a non-null trading volume 
are considered. The number of observations are consequently not the same for 
all the stocks. The data is conditional on the existence of indicative prices in 
the first part of the preopening period. This further reduces the number of ob-
servations. P-values are reported in parenthesis 
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Table 5 – Information incorporated in transaction prices 
This table presents the result of OLS regression of the returns from the previous trading 
session to the next trading session onto the returns from the previous trading session to 
the current trading session. The return at the date t is computed as the difference be-
tween the price at date t and the price at date t-1, divided by the price at the date t-1. 
Only the days with a non-null trading volume are considered. The number of observa-
tions are consequently no the same for all the stocks. The data is conditional on the 
existence of indicative prices in the first part of the preopening period. This further 
reduces the number of observations. P-values are reported in parenthesis.  
 
 
Table 4 indicates that, for some stocks, early indicative prices in-
corporate information. This is supported by the fact that 1  is 
statistically significant 5 times out of 8 at the 10% error level (4 
times out of 8 at the 5% error level). Using data from Tables 4 
and 5, the amount of information revealed in the first part of the 
preopening period can be measured by the ratio between the R² 
of the regression using the average indicative price during the first 
part of the preopening period and the R² of the regression using 
the call price. Across the stocks analyzed, 44% of the information 
is on average revealed during the first part of the preopening pe-
riod, i.e. long before trading takes place.  
However indicative prices during the preopening period do not 
reflect all the information that is incorporated in the call price. 
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This can be seen from the fact that 1  is overall smaller than 1, 
or from the fact that the R² in Table 4 are in general smaller than 
the R² in Table 5. This could leave room to insiders’ profit. In the 
context of sunshine trading, the agents cannot afford to profit 
from insiders’ profits without suffering from future denial of li-
quidity provision. Large broker-dealers who implement sunshine 
trading are thus less likely to be identified as insiders. This is con-
trary to what one would expect if the large broker-dealers were 
colluding to manipulate prices. 
 
Table 6 – Identification of insiders 
This table reports the number stocks out of the selected stocks in the model 
sample for which a broker- dealer has been identified as an insider. To identify 
insiders, for each stock and each broker-dealer, they regressed the future return 
at the date t onto the signed position taken by the broker-dealer at date t. A 
broker-dealer will be considered as an insider if it has a positive coefficient 
with a p-value smaller than or equal to 10%. The future return at date t is com-
puted as the difference between the price at date t+1 and the price at date t, 
divided by the price at date t. Only the days with a non-null trading volume are 
considered 
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Table 6 reports the number of times each broker-dealer has been iden-
tified as an insider across the stocks in the sample. Overall, very few 
broker-dealers have been identified as insiders. This indicates that 
the adverse selection risk on the market is fairly low. This may 
appear surprising in an emerging market but can be explained by 
the fact that information is revealed during the preopening period. 
Furthermore, the broker-dealers identified as insiders are not the 
major broker-dealers of the marketplace. 
These major broker-dealers are indeed the ones susceptible to en-
gage in sunshine trading, and are thus the ones who may suffer 
from future liquidity denials. If they engage in sunshine trading, 
it seems reasonable to think that they do not attempt to mislead 
their trading partners. On the other hand, the small broker-dealers 
that do not receive liquidity shocks because they do not deal much 
with outside investors can afford to profit from private infor-
mation if they have some. Altogether, these results suggest that 
broker-dealers in the West African Bourse did not manipulate 
prices to their advantage. 
 
2.3 Critical View of the Literature 
 
The studies about sunshine trading described above are in my 
opinion the most important empirical studies up to the present 
day, principally the studies of Admati (1986), Hellwig(1980) and 
Pfleiderer (1984) are the most important because thanks to it all 
the other researchers have been able to enlarge the concept related 
to the sunshine trading strategies. 
The Admati study is really interesting and of course the capacity 
of understanding sunshine trading in relation to that study pre-
sents some considerations to make. 
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The document is based on the concept of preannouncement, and, 
on the fact that only informationless traders are able to prean-
nounce. 
In my opinion the preannouncement, to be a good element for a 
market, should be made by intermediaries such as brokers, who 
would presumably acquire valuable reputations over time for 
screening out informed traders. To preserve their reputation, the 
intermediaries would then ensure that preannouncement is only 
made by liquidity traders, in fact, if this is not real, the market 
could be assumed to be full of bluffers or insider traders. It is also 
interesting to analyze from this document that preannouncement 
signals an informationless trade which is related to the potential 
costs of preannouncement for an informed trader. 
As we know preannouncement entails a delay in the execution of 
the order, this delay in order of making profit can be more costly 
for informed traders than to liquidity traders. There could be the 
possibility that, if the information is likely to be short-lived, an 
informed trader may not want to delay his trade. 
In my opinion preannouncement has to consider also the fact that, 
being in the market place where profit is all about work, prean-
nouncement cannot be a good strategy for the traders who have 
really profitable information, they also have to consider the pos-
sibility of reduction of their trading profits26. 
Generally, informational effects of preannouncement tends to in-
crease the informativeness of the equilibrium price. This might 
reduce some of the risk-sharing benefits of trading between li-
quidity traders and speculators, and therefore reduce the potential 
benefits of preannouncement. 
To better understand, we can suppose for example that announc-
ers have endowment shocks in their holdings of non-trade assets, 
                                                          
26 Consider that if all informed traders are dissuaded from preannouncing and 
if information is costly, then in equilibrium the preannouncement will no trig-
ger information acquisition, and so informed traders will want to prean-
nounce.  
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whose payoffs are correlated with the payoff of the risk asset. If 
there is a huge sharing of information about the asset’s payoff it 
is revealed at the rime of trade because of preannouncement, the 
risky asset becomes a less effective hedge for the announcers. We 
can say that preannouncement significantly increases the average 
level of entry, and also creates a correlation between the entry 
level and the size of the preannounced order. 
I think that an analysis like this doesn’t allow the ability to choose 
whether or not to engage in preannouncement. However, if the 
practice of preannouncement is established, it is relatively easier 
for announcers to be able to choose whether to preannounce a 
particular order or not. The model gives a kind of useful result if 
we look in the prospective of expected payoffs and trading cost, 
in fact, the results can be used to analyze in a theoretical way, 
when the announcers are interested in minimizing their expected 
trading costs.  
The model is also interesting because it shows that if not all spec-
ulators enter the market without preannouncement, then the only 
possible equilibrium of the model in which announcers choose 
whether to preannounce is one in which all realization of the an-
nouncers’ demand are preannounced. If the entry cost is so low 
that all speculators enter without preannouncement, then there is 
another equilibrium in which no preannouncement ever takes 
place. 
In this model the researcher take the allocation of information as 
given, preannouncement is likely to have implications for the in-
centives to collect private information, which would affect the in-
formation allocation and the resulting market equilibrium. From 
the result of the studies we can say that, when preannouncement 
works, it gives a more informative price. As a consequence of 
this, of course the possibility to pay for excessive costly infor-
mation will be reduced. 
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I think it is also important to take into consideration that less in-
formation acquisition generally gives a higher level of uncertainty 
associated with the risky asset, because if this is true that there is 
no need for information because the trades could be efficient in 
this way, but I think that in this way also the principal mechanism 
of the trading markets, the sharing of information, do not work 
and the whole system could be damaged. Anyway, these aspects, 
which would, in turn raise the risk bearing costs borne by both 
announcers and no announcers. 
I’d also like to consider another aspect, looking at the model 
presentation there could be some problems in relation to the con-
cept expressed, the front running effect could be a very interesting 
aspect to analyze in relation to the model. 
Front running refers to a situation in which a trader, knowing that 
an order is about to be placed, trades in the same direction before 
the order is executed. The front-runner plans to unwind his posi-
tion after the original order is executed and hopes to profit 
through price of the original order. 
The preannouncement strategy is very risky from this point of 
view, it exposes announcer to high possibility of front running 
activities that might work to their disadvantage.  
From these studies there are some considerations that can suggest 
that front running will not hurt the announcers in an equilibrium 
context. 
I think that on a kind of analysis like that, the good way for a 
preannouncement to change the influence on the market is thanks 
to the entry decision of the speculators, that can play an important 
role in the game of infomativeness and liquidity of a market. The 
figure of the speculators in this model is crucial, they provide li-
quidity to the market, but as we know the figure of speculator is 
strictly related to the possibility of making profit in a specific 
market, therefore, providing liquidity only at a cost because they 
expect a compensation for the risks assumed. 
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In this model of the financial market, they assumed that there is a 
continuum of speculators. Since the actions of each speculator 
have no measurable effect on the price, each behaves competi-
tively. Generally the risk-bearing and adverse-selection costs 
continue to exist when speculators are imperfectly competitive 
and preannouncement will have the same types of effects on these 
costs as it did in our analysis. 
We can observe from this study that, when there are positive entry 
costs and imperfect competition, the expected trading cost of a 
liquidity trader is decreasing in the number of speculators not only 
because a larger number of speculators improves the risk-bearing 
capacity of the market, but also because a larger number of spec-
ulators increases the degree of competition. 
Since preannouncement lowers the risk of entry for speculators, 
it tends to increase the average size of the market and therefore 
the average degree competition. 
We can also see that preannouncement introduces a positive cor-
relation between the size of preannounced order and the degree 
of competition. This correlation will lower trading costs on large 
orders and increase them on smaller orders; the net effect will be 
a reduction in expected trading costs. Because of these effects on 
the degree of competition, preannouncement may reduce ex-
pected trading costs by even more in a model with imperfect com-
petition.  
Concerning the De Frutos and Manzano model there is a kind of 
consequence of what we have analyzed in the previous chapter 
and also in the SLE concept discussed above where the concepts 
of market transparency are dealt with. 
Focalizing on the sunshine trading strategies the model they de-
cide to assume that the decision to reveal the orders (prior to trad-
ing) is done voluntarily by the noise traders. 
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From the studies is derived that noise traders decides to adopt a 
sunshine trading strategies independent of his order size, gener-
ally it is given to the fact that their strategies are not based on 
particular knowledge or some strategies. 
However, could be different situation where for example the 
noise traders with higher liquidity needs are more interested in 
sunshine trading, for particular necessity or for example for rea-
son external to the specific markets(the noise meaning itself 
means something that most of the time have no sense). 
Interesting result is also that when the market are very large, noise 
traders opt most of the time for sunshine trading, maybe because 
when the number are very huge everyone knows that their order 
also if they are relatively big can’t modify the structure of the 
market at all. 
To conclude the analysis I decide to make an analysis more prac-
tical in order to better understand the logic and the phases related 
to a trading market where is active a sunshine trading optical for 
the traders that works in. 
The paper of Maguey Dia and Sebastian Pouget named “Sunshine 
Trading in an African Market” studies sunshine trading phenom-
enon in this precise financial markets. Of course, given the fact 
that this market is particular for its structure and number of oper-
ation, we cannot assume the result as real for every market, but 
given these particular characteristic the authors was able to ana-
lyze the sunshine trading phenomenon. 
The model uses data from the West African Bourse, it shows that  
part of the large orders are placed early during the preopening 
period and are not cancelled; than it see that for some stocks, ten-
tative prices reveal information long before trading actually oc-
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curs and at the end that large volumes are transacted without sig-
nificant price movements27. Market participants appear to imple-
ment sunshine trading strategies in order to enhance market li-
quidity28.  
This paper shows some implications with global portfolio man-
agement. The model shows that the West African Bourse has a 
very high liquidity respect to what is indicated by the average 
state of the order book. 
In line of what we have observed in the previous studies consid-
ered we can say how sunshine trading is always a seen good from 
traders with high liquidity and with the goal to attract liquidity 
providers.  
From the analysis we can see that in this particular market there 
is a latent liquidity that is not reflected in the order book because 
of the cost of market participation, and that appears only when 
traders engage in sunshine trading. 
Other consideration are related to the fact that preopening period 
may play an important informational role and enhance welfare, 
principally this aspect is verified when we look at market with 
specific structures like the West African bourse, where the num-
ber of stocks and the number of operation are not so high. 
To conclude market organizers may thus have an interest in 
providing traders with pre-trade communication platforms such 
as preopening periods as a way mean to disseminate information 
that most of the time are the reason why operation are not 
made(the phenomenon of insider trading) regarding both liquidity 
needs and asset valuation29. 
                                                          
 
28 Consistently with Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) and with Dia and Pouget 
(2010). 
29  [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18] [Figure 1, 2] from 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) “Sunshine trading and market Equilibrium”; [19, 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24] [Figure 3, 4] from de Frutos and Manzano “Market trans-
parency, market quality, and sunshine trading; [25, 26, 27, 28] [Table 1, 2, 3, 
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3 Estimation of Equity Market 
Impact 
 
As we have seen in all the examples shown in the previous chap-
ter, sunshine trading is considered as a very important element by 
all the researchers for the future trading world, but, is it really 
profitable? When we try to put the theoretical analysis to the re-
ality are all the concepts and the results real? 
With my studies I will try to enlarge this concept not only con-
centrating my studies on sunshine trading but, I will try to look at 
trading markets as if I was an investor trying to understand with 
the information that I have, what could be the best strategy to use, 
taking into account sunshine trading as well as other possible 
strategies, and compare all these results to work out if it is really 
profitable.  
My analysis aims to show a linear model that can represent the 
impacts that may occur on a market and, starting from this ele-
ment, studying the possible market strategies in relation to the 
sensitivity of the impacts themselves. In that way I can see, hav-
ing different results, in which market or stock trend I can ap-
proach a particular trading strategy. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The description of the model 
is in section 3.1. In section 3.2, there is an explanation of the data. 
In section 3.3, variable analysis; 3.4 The volume observations; 3.5 
the trajectory cost model; 3.6 Permanent and Temporary impact 
developments; 3.7 choice of functional form; In section 3.8 there 
are representations of the model in a series of examples and in 
section 3.9 the residual analysis.  
 
                                                          
4, 5, 6] from Dias and Pouget (2010) “Sunshine trading in an African Stock 
Market”. 
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3.1 Description 
 
I would like to start my analysis focalizing my study on the trans-
action movements’ impact on a particular market and what ele-
ments provoke changes. 
When we look at the markets we know that investment perfor-
mance are strictly related to the market movements.  
When we look at a particular trend we can assume that impacts 
are divided into two principal categories: 
 Direct: derived from market operation, they are explicitly 
stated. 
 Indirect: they are not explicitly stated. These impacts are the 
hardest to understand and, principally for large traders, this is 
an important component. 
Many past work has been devoted to understand and quantify 
market impact costs. Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk (2002) stud-
ied the net market movement over five-minutes and half-hour 
time periods against the net buy-sell imbalance during the same 
period, using a linear impact model; similar work was done by 
Kissell and Glantz (2003); Dufour and Engle (2000) to investigate 
the key role of waiting between successive trades. 
Lilo, Farmer and Mantegna (2003) find some evidence for a 
power-law scaling in the impact cost function, and they found a 
lot of dependence between market capitalization and daily vol-
ume. Bouchaud, Gefen, Pottersand and Wyart (2004) also studied 
the several correlation between volume and price data.   
My personal goal is to make an analysis of indirect impact by the 
most commons stocks of S&P 500, and try to explain these im-
pacts through few explanatory variables in a way that can give me 
estimations of these impacts and control of the data.                 
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The model concept starts from the idea of dividing markets into 
permanent and temporary impact (Almgren and Chriss (2000)); 
the permanent component is combined with information, mean-
while, temporary component rising from the liquidity demands 
derived by movements in a short time. 
My personal idea of analysis is based on the management and 
evaluation of impacts, based on past observations that affects the 
markets. In this way, I able to understand how a stock can influ-
ence the market. This is an optimal start point to develop the anal-
ysis that a market operator can do, both as regards the strategy 
that want to use, both as regards the reliability and transparency 
of a market. 
 
3.2 Data 
 
The dataset on which the analysis is based is composed by the last 
two years movement of the most common stock in the S&P 500, 
from January 2014 to December 2015. 
The data is downloaded from Google-finance and is a variation 
measurement of one minute’s time. In Google Finance, intra-day 
data is available in several frequencies. The construction of the 
sample is based on the selection of stocks that have a higher vol-
ume level, in this way I am able to analyze more precisely how 
the volumes will be determined in the assessment of impacts. 
Through the selection of measures of movement of significant 
volume our sample goes to a reduced number of 50 stocks ana-
lyzed30. 
In this way I am able to observe in a detailed way the sensibility 
of a market and the indirect element that can influence itself. 
                                                          
30The dataset is taken by the following link:Example: 
http://www.google.com/fi-
nance/getprices?i=60&p=10d&f=d,o,h,l,c,v&df=cpct&q=IBM (example bout 
IBM dataset). 
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A market operation generally is split in two or more transactions 
and obviously the impact of a particular operation could not be 
immediate, then, taking into account this point I focalize my ob-
servation selecting part of the time series where the volume is sig-
nificant and I observed variation over time for this determined 
period, that, on average, is longer than a typical trading trajectory. 
Hence, I tried to observe when market movements are consistent, 
how the signal and the operations influence the system. 
The model selection, as I said before, is based on the volume trade 
operation and, for this reason for every stock selected I took into 
consideration the period with high significant volume that is di-
rectly linked with a major market activity for these particular pe-
riods selected.                                                    
Volume is a measure for the intensity and pressure which are the 
basis of a trend.  
The greater the volume, the more reliable the long-term trend in 
place will be. The analysis of the volumes thus, provides a num-
ber of important confirmation signals or uncertainty of the trend. 
The volume represents a set of the transactions carried out on a 
tilt in a given unit of time. In other words, they show the interest 
that investors are placing in a stock or in a market. 
Studying the volumes provides a greater or lesser dynamism 
which can help in predicting how they develop the business on 
the market and provides important information on the interest of 
a particular movement of the operators. 
From the analysis of the relationship between prices and the vol-
ume it is generally possible to understand the degree of intensity 
characterizes the supply and demand pressures in the market. The 
volume trend represents a confirmation of the validity of the 
movement in place, when the phases of expansion and contraction 
follow the same direction of prices. 
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3.3 Variable Analysis 
As I said above my purpose is to portray the market through few 
numbers of input variables. For our selected data we started with 
measuring market impacts. 
Let’s assume P(t) is the price of the asset assumed in a particular 
period selected, we choose the following inputs: 
 P0 : market price before the period selected 
 Ppost: market price after the period selected 
 ?̅?: average realized price during this period 
We selected a period where the volume is significant and through 
an evaluation of a determined time we analyze these three inputs.  
The pre-impact price P0 is the price before the impact of the sig-
nificant volume period analyzed (it could be assumed as an ap-
proximation, since some information may leak before any record 
enters the system).        
The Ppost should take the “permanent” effect of the period exam-
ined. 
To be a good input estimator Ppost should be taken long enough 
after the period selected is closed. 
In Dufour, A. and R.F. Engle (2000) I found that one-half hour 
after the period examined is adequate to the analysis, then, I de-
fined a time period as: 
 
𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑡𝑛 +
1
2
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟                                                     (1) 
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Starting from these points, the impact variables are: 
 
𝐼 =
𝑃𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑃0
𝑃0
                                                 (2) 
𝐽 =
?̅? − 𝑃0
𝑃0
                                                        (3) 
 
Where I is the permanent impact and J the Realized impact. 
Of the two impacts J is the most interesting, it describes the real 
movement in terms of market structure on the period analyzed. 
My personal goal is the determination in a more linear possible 
way of the elaboration of a realized and permanent impact. 
The result of these two observations could be positive or negative, 
it depends on the volatility factor, and, on price movement given 
from a higher number of buyers or sellers on the market. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1- Summary statistics of my observation: mean and quartile lev-
els for each of several descriptive variables. The variables are very 
nearly distributed about zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Permanent impact 
(I%) 
0,01 -3,95 -0,17 0,01 0,19 2,66 
Realized impact 
(J%) 
0,03 -3,57 -0,11 0,02 0,17 2,33 
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3.3 Volume observations  
 
The level of market activity is known to vary substantially in dif-
ferent periods of trading day, this element influences all market 
processes.  
To make a better analysis, I decided to divide day’s volume from 
t = 0 to t = 1, with t =0 for market opening and t = 1 for market 
closing. 
Taking into account these elements about volume, I want to de-
scribe the impacts I and J in terms of the following input quanti-
ties: 
 
𝑋 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                            (4) 
𝑇 = 𝑡𝑛 − 𝑡0                                               (5) 
 
𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑡0                                   (6) 
 
Where X is the average volume for a particular relevant period, T 
is the duration of the observed period and Tpost is the impact du-
ration of the observed period. 
X can be assumed as the volume average of the period selected; 
as well as I described before volume is a very interesting element 
to analyze impacts and, under certain aspects, X can be assumed 
as a very similar data of aspects, X can be assumed as a very sim-
ilar data of a normalized significant order for a period selected. 
T and Tpost are two crucial data, given the fact that the time, prin-
cipally for temporary impact is important. 
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Other important auxiliaries are taken into account in my model, 
so not only X, J, I but also: 
V = Average daily volume in shares 
σ = daily volatility 
V represents a ten day moving average; for my model analyzes 
volatility in terms of changes of time which is fundamental to 
catch permanent and temporary impact. 
These values are useful mainly to “normalize” the moving varia-
bles through stocks with largely varying properties. On the con-
tinuous of the model I will prefer to use the variable X/V that 
seems a more reasonable variable with respect to X itself. 
In this model, the selection of volume periods, as a part of the 
average market value, represents a crucial point for the analysis. 
On the other hand, I use volatility to define the impacts, hence, 
for a given participation for the daily volume there should be a 
determined level of participation in the “normal” flow of the 
stocks. 
My empirical results display that the most important scale factor 
for the impact is volatility. 
 
3.4 Trajectory Cost Model 
 
As I mentioned before, the model follows the decomposition of 
the price impact into two components.   
In addition, to make the model simpler, I assumed that the volume 
trade is constant during the time selected, and, I omit cross im-
pact, because data-information doesn’t contain any detail about 
the conditioning effect between stock prices of different stock. 
Given all these elements the market impact can be assumed as 
two components: 
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 Permanent: crucial element component of the trading market, 
in my model I assumed this value independent on T. 
 Temporary: more sophisticated component that is the result 
of possible price concession needed to attract counterparties 
in a short time interval. The time for temporary impact is fun-
damental, it is highly sensitive to this factor. 
 
Interesting studies about these concepts have been developed also 
by Madhavan (2000). 
The realized impact for a market can be assumed as: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
The temporary impact is not directly observable, and, for this rea-
son I elaborate the model below.                                                         
We start with an observable volume movement X; when the vol-
ume is high, the more intense and precise the market is, the higher 
the volume and clearer the trend and the impacts will be. 
To represent the model better I introduced a trade rate in volume 
X/T, taking T as the fraction of time selected (it can be assumed 
as a percentage of the total day trading). 
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3.5 Permanent and Temporary im-
pact 
 
 
3.5.1 Permanent impact 
 
The model assumes that P(t) follows an arithmetic Brownian mo-
tion, following a drift dependent on v = X/T 
 
𝑑𝑃 = 𝑃0𝑔(𝑣)𝑑𝑡 + 𝑃0𝜎𝑑𝐵𝑡                                                         (7) 
 
Where Bt is a standard Brownian motion, g(v) is a permanent im-
pact function assuming g(0) = 0 and t is the volume time observed 
and it represents a fraction average of an average day’s volume. 
I introduce the time in the expression, taking v = X/T for 0 ≤ t ≤ 
T and I obtained the permanent impact: 
𝐼 = 𝑇𝑔 (
𝑋
𝑇
) + 𝜎√𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝜉                                                (8) 
Where 𝜉 is a standard Gaussian variate (𝜉 ~ N(0;1)) and g(v) is a 
linear function. 
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3.5.2 Temporary impact 
 
We can imagine that the composition for impacts in a market is 
structured as follows: 
 ?̃?(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑃0ℎ (
𝑋
𝑇
)                                                (9) 
Where ℎ (
𝑋
𝑇
) is a temporary impact function. 
The equation above is a continuous-time approximation to a dis-
crete process. 
For having a better perspective of temporary impact, it is better to 
imagine the division of time in one hour or even better in a one-
half hour, this optical can give us an accurate description. 
Taking into account the time factor observed before I assumed the 
temporary impact as: 
 
𝐽 −
𝐼
2
= ℎ (
𝑋
𝑇
) + 𝜎 (√
𝑇
13
(4 − 3
𝑇
𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
) 𝜔 −
𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇
2√𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝜉) (10) 
 
Where ω ~ N(0,1) and ξ ~ N(0,1) are independent. 
The previous observations of permanent impact caused by past 
movements can be represented by 
𝐼
2
. 
The error term components, on the other side, considers the drift 
of the Brownian motion on [0, T] for his middle part. 
The data fitting proceedings is quite linear: we compute the im-
pact observations I, J from the data analyzed and then, regress 
those values against the volume size and time to pull out directly 
the function g(v) and h(v). 
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3.6 Choice of Functional Form 
 
To have a better understanding and structure the model we also 
have to choose what should be the form of g(v) and h(v), perma-
nent and temporary impact functions. 
At this point we have to postulate that the functions are power 
laws, making the hypothesis: 
 
𝑔(𝑣) = 𝛾|𝑣|𝛼                                                         (11) 
And 
ℎ(𝑣) = 𝜂|𝑣|𝛽                                                          (12) 
 
Where the parameter γ and η and the coefficient should be deter-
mined through linear regression data and making some hypothe-
sis. 
The choice of the exponents is extremely difficult, also because 
with our data it is particularly challenging to enlarge some obser-
vations. 
We are far from neutral in the choice of the exponents. 
The permanent impact function should be assumed free from ar-
bitrage, given my previous assumption; for this reason I prefer the 
linear model α = 1. There are strong arguments supporting this 
choice in Huberman and Stanzl (2004). 
Moreover, to make the permanent price impact independent of 
time observation the linear function is the only adaptable one. 
For the temporary impact the function should be concave, on this 
purpose there are ample empirical evidence that indicates how the 
function should be concave, then 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.   
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Loeb (1983) gives strong evidence for this, and, in the same way 
Lillo, farmer and Montegna (2003). Barra (1997) suggest in par-
ticular theoretic arguments that β= ½ is particularly conceivable, 
giving a square-root impact function. 
Assuming this exponent, as it is largely explained by their au-
thors, a mere linear regression is sufficient to define the coeffi-
cients. For this regression I utilized heteroskedastic weighing 
with the error magnitude in (8, 10). 
All these analysis have been made not only to find the coefficients 
of these regressions, but I have also taken into account the collec-
tion of error residuals ξ and ω, that must be considered the nor-
mality as they presume (results are showed below). 
With the model as we have explained above, I assumed a “hypo-
thetical” asset without considering that all the properties may 
change during the time. For example, I can imagine that if I want 
an execution of a given number of shares, it would incur a higher 
impact cost if I am trading on a day with unusually low volume 
or with unusually high volatility. 
I, therefore, should assume in the model that the natural variable 
of trading impact is not the movement volume per se, but the 
movement in relation to the background flow for a particular 
stock in the time period when observations will occur. 
Then the impact function should be X/VT rather than X/T; where 
v is the average number of operations per day. 
On the other hand, observations should not be assumed as raw 
observations of percentage movements, but they should be as-
sumed as a fraction of the “normal” daily movement of the price, 
for this reason I also give great importance to daily volatility σ. 
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Taking into account these observations I changed the previous 
expressions into: 
 
𝐼 = 𝜎 𝑇𝑔 (
𝑋
𝑉𝑇
) + 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                  (14) 
𝐽 −
𝐼
2
= 𝜎 ℎ (
𝑋
𝑉𝑇
) + 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒                                              (15) 
 
The error expression depending on volatility is represented by the 
noise g(v) and h(v) can be explained as dimensionless functions 
of a dimensionless variable. 
After this modification, I will also be taking into consideration 
the fact that many variables change across stock, also in very dif-
ferent ways. This is because, movements and impacts depend on 
many other factors such as outstanding, bid-ask spread or market 
capitalization. 
From this perspective, I think that temporary impact function can-
not have substantial influences, but, on the other hand there are 
some modifications to do from a permanent perspective. 
The “liquidity factor” for example is extremely important and it 
should be inserted in the function g(v), this element is more indi-
vidual and it depends on particular stocks. 
Let’s assume Ɩ as liquidity factor, we can assume it as: 
 
Ɩ = (
𝛩
𝑉
)
𝛿
                (16) 
 
Where Θ is the total number of shares outstanding, and the pa-
rameter δ is simply an exponential factor. 
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This observation is a ratio that describes the inverse turnover31. 
Accordingly, we can write the model as: 
 
𝐼
𝜎
= 𝛾 𝑇 (
𝑋
𝑉𝑇
)
𝛼
(
𝛩
𝑉
)
𝛿
+ 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒                                     (17) 
1
𝜎
(𝐽 −
𝐼
2
) = 𝜂 (
𝑋
𝑉𝑇
)
𝛽
+ 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒                                    (18) 
 
The only element to find out is the exponent δ that I assumed 
equal to ¼ in an approximate way, taking into consideration the 
studies of Huberman and Stanzl (2004) and from Breen, Hodrick, 
and Korajczyk (2002) where the topic is critically discussed. 
Hence: 
 the impact of J shows that there is an increment with Θ, the 
total number of shares outstanding. 
 Permanent impact is linear 
 Temporary impact as described in past studies has a concavity 
function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 This observation is widely observed on Breen, Hodrick, and Korajczyk 
(2002). 
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After deciding the exponent values, I defined the values of γ and 
η with linear regression of the model above, using heteroscedas-
ticity error estimates given in (1, 2), I found: 
 
𝛾 = 0.320 ± 0.042     (𝑡 = 7.67)   
𝜂 = 0.143 ± 0.0061     (𝑡 = 21) 
 
The t-statistics are computed assuming that the Gaussian model 
in 1, 2 is verified. 
The error estimates are the value divided by the t-statistics. 
The 𝑅2 values for these analysis are generally less than 1%, this 
indicates that only a small part of the volume of the dependent 
variables I and J is explained by the model in terms of the inde-
pendent variables. 
The γ and η coefficients are assumed as “homogeneous coeffi-
cient of market impact”: as they are imagined in my mind can be 
applied to every asset in the entire data set. 
To summarize all my results, the final equations are as follows: 
 
𝐼 = 𝛾 𝜎 
𝑋
𝑉
(
𝛩
𝑉
)
1/4
+ 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒                                        (19) 
𝐽 =
𝐼
2
+ 𝜂 𝜎 (
𝑋
𝑉𝑇
)
3/5
+ 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒                                  (20) 
 
They give us the expectation of the market impact for every stock 
market selected. 
It is easily understood how volatility moves my observations in a 
deterministic way. I chose to structure my observations in an eas-
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ier and more linear way, but more detailed models could be con-
structed to capture more precise elements of a market (maybe, it 
could more internal data be helpful, unfortunately I am not able 
to have today). 
I should expect that probably coefficients, exponents, and maybe 
the forms of the model can be continually changed in order to 
reflect more detailed and recent data. 
 
3.7 Examples  
 
In table 2 I use my model in order to see how to demonstrate the 
results. 
I selected two different stocks of two different markets in order 
to see clearly the difference of the model results. 
As we know, Google is one of the most important companies in 
the USA, and its structure is an example to follow for all the com-
panies that do the same business. Its revenues are for 90% gener-
ated from advertising, and its image of solidity gives great power 
to the company. 
On the other hand, General Motors is a very different company in 
respect to Google, it is an American multinational corporation 
that designs, manufactures, markets and distributes vehicles. The 
two companies do business in a completely different way, and, 
for this reason I selected these two companies for a deeper analy-
sis of my model. 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
 
 
Table 2 - The table shows permanent and temporary impact costs, for 
a value of 10% day average volume, for two very different stocks. The 
value W is the temporary impact cost, and it depends on time. I write 
W= J – I/2. 
 
In these numerical examples I considered volume analyzed of the 
average daily volume of 10%, then we can assume that volume 
percentage taken into consideration is equal to a fraction of the 
trading made by one hypothetical customer, that for example in a 
trading day session buys 10% of the total daily average volume. 
From this analysis we can see how in Google’s case the turnover 
is 1/91 meanwhile for General Motors is 1/41 of its total shares 
each day. This means that GM has a greater level of mobility in 
respect to GOOGL, this is given to the fact that Google has a 
greater number of shares outstanding compared to General Mo-
tors. 
From my model it’s evident that, on an equal normalized volume 
size of 0,1 for the two stocks, we have a permanent impact for 
GOOGL of 27 and 20 for GM. This indicates that the movement 
selected shows us how a movement is equal to 0,1 compared to 
the total volume of a single day has a more significant effect on  
GOOGL than GM. 
  GOOGL GM 
Average daily volume - V 7,584M 40,329M 
Daily volatility(%) – σ 2,78% 2,42% 
Norm. volume size - X/V 0,1 0,1 
Shares outstanding - Θ 688,32M 1,640M 
Inverse turnover - Θ/V 91 41 
Norm. permanent - I/σ 0,097 0,082 
Permanent price impact - I 27 20 
Duration (days) – T 0,1 0,2 0,5 0,1 0,2 0,5 
Norm. temporary - W/σ 0,144 0,093 0,054 0,145 0,054 0,012 
Temporary impact cost - W 40 26 15 35 13 3 
Realized cost – J 53 39 28 45 23 13 
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The permanent impact function is linear, and, as I said before the 
permanent cost numbers are independent of the time scale of ex-
ecution. 
On the other hand, temporary impact as is explained above is 
strictly related to the time component, for this reason I split the 
time in three different sections in order see how, with different 
time horizons of operations, the impacts change; obviously, the 
greater the time window, the lower the temporary impact32. 
From the analysis of the two companies, it is clear that temporary 
impact is greater for GOOGL compared to GM, even considering 
a volume/trade size of 0,1. Interesting results are noticeable when 
we look at the greater values of T, the difference between the two 
stocks is more evident. 
More extended points of view are given by figure 1 and 2 where 
some selected stocks of my sample are shown from the S&P 500 
companies. 
From this prospective it is easily visible which company has a 
greater permanent impact consequence. From our analysis, great 
importance is given by the daily volatility and, also in these fig-
ures we can see how these impacts are influenced by this data. 
From this approach we can also understand better which hypo-
thetical strategies to adopt and, in the following chapter my stud-
ies are focused on that. 
One particular characteristic that stands out from these figures is 
how, in this way, also for stocks in the same sector there could be 
completely different observations. 
For the temporary impact, we can look at three different periods 
of time (T), this element can be really important in an optical of 
trading where there could be the difficulty in choosing a specific 
trading strategy. 
                                                          
32 These could be useful data to understand trading strategies. 
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Understanding how impact can persist during the time is a crucial 
element for the selection of stocks for particular trading strate-
gies. 
 
Figure 1, 2 - Representation of a sample of selected stocks from S&P 
500 used for our model description. Figure 1 represents the Permanent 
impact and figure 2 Temporary impact. 
 
From the data we can easily see how MRO has a greater impact 
compared to the other one, this can be explained by a very signif-
icant daily volatility (above 5%) and an inverse turnover rela-
tively low compared to the average of the selected stocks. 
 MRO has a great impact, it is principally related to the uncer-
tainty related to the oil market of the last years, and on this optical 
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the model describes in a correct way the abnormality of the mar-
ket. 
On the other hand we can see how JNJ has a really low impact 
result for permanent and temporary impacts, this is also explained 
thanks to a very low daily volatility (1,14%) but also to a more 
stable liquidity index that shows a lower level of mobility. 
Johnson and Johnson probably has a lower impact in respect to 
MRO also because the location of the market is undoubtedly more 
predictable in respect to the oil market. 
In the next chapter I will enlarge these results that are showing up 
from my model in more practical terms taking into consideration 
the possible different scenarios and the possible different trading 
strategies adoptable. 
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3.8 Residual Analysis 
 
The results are not only the values discovered from my analysis. 
As it is written above we have used error formulation for the re-
siduals, ξ and ω. The means are close to zero and the variance is 
reasonably close to 1, the only exception is the fat-tailed33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3, 4 -logarithmic histograms of residual errors ξ and χ, for the 
period sample selected and for permanent and temporary impact respec-
tively. The dotted line demonstrates the value that would be presumed 
in a standard Gaussian distribution of zero mean, and variance equal to 
1. The distribution is fat-tailed, but, the standard Gaussian is a rational 
fit to the central part. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Rydberg (2000), shows how is normal for return distributions on medium-short time intervals the presence 
of fat-tailed distribution. 
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4 Sunshine Trading: impact 
and comparison with other 
strategies 
 
Starting with the achievements of the previous chapter, where we 
studied the impacts in terms of liquidity linked to the temporary 
and permanent impact, now I want to focus more in the possible 
points of view that a market participant may have when it ap-
proach with specific situations, in this way we will be able to have 
a broader perspective and be able to have clearer ideas not only 
on sunshine trading, but also for the markets in general. 
My goal is to propose a linear and easy demonstration about stra-
tegic position of a trader respect to a market, and at the same time 
evident comparison between different trading strategies. 
I think that for a trader that want to evaluate a specific market and, 
in which way approach to it, it is more important what the per-
ceptions of a market are. 
Generally, the market structure is more influenced about 
“voices”, “impressions” and temporary and possible permanent 
effect rather than the effectiveness reaching and evaluation of the 
real value. On a market that works in this way, then, permanent 
and temporary studies can assume a great value as they are de-
scribed by Almgren and Chriss (2001).     
I enlarged this concept trying to construct a linear model where, 
thanks to the permanent and temporary impacts analyzed in the 
previous chapter, we can understand more clearly the optimal 
strategies to use when we are trying to approach a specific market, 
and so, understanding in comparison with other trading strategies 
if sunshine trading could be a better strategy respect to the others.      
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Finally, to have a better understanding of the model, I showed 
different graphs representing the impact results for different hy-
pothetical strategy under some assumptions. 
 
4.1 Market scenarios 
 
We have to understand better the world in which we are operating 
and the trading strategies related to the market structure where we 
want to operate. We could find an optimal strategy using sunshine 
trading in a particular market and, at the same time we could find 
that sunshine trading is the worst strategy to adopt. 
Generally financial markets are typically defined by having trans-
parent pricing, basic regulation on trading costs and fees, and 
market forces determining the price of securities that trade. 
Financial investors, especially thanks to the technological pro-
gress, have access to a large number of financial markets and ex-
change represents a vast array of financial products. Some of 
these markets have always been open to private investors; others 
remained the exclusive domain of major international banks and 
financial professionals. 
Financial markets can be found in every nation in the world. Some 
are very small, with only few participants, while others, for ex-
ample NYSE and the forex markets, trade trillions of dollars 
daily; sunshine trading can be actuated in every market, but sun-
shine trading is not equal in every market. 
To make a good decision in order to adopt the right strategies we 
have to make a deep analysis starting from the observation of the 
market, then, understanding how companies, markets and the 
traders that operate in a specific market work, how they compete 
and how they respond to the changes. Understanding market 
structure provides a starting point for judging industry and market 
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news, policy changes and legislation and how it shapes the per-
sonal investing decision. Also understanding the general behavior 
of other operators is crucial better decisions on which strategies 
to adopt. 
Starting to look at the market structure there are several basic de-
fending characteristics for a correct analysis: 
the commodity or item that is sold and the level of differentiation 
between them; the number of companies in the market; the case 
or difficulty of entering the market share of the biggest firms; the 
relationship between producers or sellers; the most important 
point for our analysis, the number of buyers/sellers and how they 
work with or against sellers/buyers to influence price and quan-
tity.  
We also have to understand how a specific market obtains the 
structure that we are going to approach, in fact, the more convo-
lute a system is, the less efficient it is likely to be. 
It is also necessary to understand if we are in a centralized market 
or in a market based on wholesale and retail order flow that is 
more complex in respect to the first one. 
In a market, if orders are being taken away from common market 
mechanism, using orders like internalization, preferencing and in-
ternal order crossing practice, it will make it harder for buyer and 
sellers to find each other in an efficient way. 
To make a better scenario analysis it is also useful to take a better 
look at the market structure and see if we are in a market near to 
one of the four specific basic types. 
If we are in a perfectly competitive market, we know that the 
forces of supply and demand determine the amount of goods and 
services produced as well as market prices set by the companies 
in the market. 
In a situation of perfect competition we should know better that 
buyers and sellers are referred to as price takers rather than price 
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influencers, than on first impact could seem wrong using a sun-
shine trading strategy, however it depends on the specific case. 
Anyway, this kind of market is really hard to discover, and this 
structure is generally a reference point from which economists 
compare the other market structure; this is true because, when 
competition is perfect in retail and wholesale order flow markets, 
low commission compensates poor execution so that inter-price 
do not ultimately depend on the best execution standards. 
Generally, if we are in a market where dealers and brokers have 
consistent power, they will exploit that power and try to reach 
excess profit as much as they can. How much excess profit they 
can obtain depends on how far or near to a competitive market the 
market is. 
Unlike perfect competition, the monopolistic competition does 
not assume lowest possible cost production. Companies in mo-
nopolistic competition sell very similar products with small dif-
ferences they use as the basis of their marketing and advertising. 
An interesting point is that, in monopolistic markets the subjects 
are price maximizers, so, when the profits are attractive, traders 
are more motivated to enter the market, so maybe a sunshine trad-
ing strategy could be a very good choice to expect a good reaction 
from the other side of the market. 
From a monopolistic side it is easy to take this into consideration. 
In a monopoly there is just one supplier, the price competition is 
then absent, the supplier is the price-maker, setting a price that 
maximizes profits. Generally in a monopoly the rules are all de-
fined and we operate in a bounded world, so I think that using 
sunshine trading or not is the same, in any case there will be no 
consequences.                                           
The last structure to analyze is the oligopoly market. Oligopoly is 
a market structure where the subjects collude, or work together to 
limit a competition and dominate a market. The crucial character-
istic is that, since market structure discourages true competition 
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the producers are able to set prices, but the market is price sensi-
tive. The dynamic relationship among and between sellers and 
buyers change pricing, profits and production levels. Traders re-
quire to know how firms react to those relationships and changes 
and forecast their reaction. In this case, taking a position is more 
subjective, so sunshine trading strategy is not so easy to recom-
mend. It is also important to take a look at the operator in a spe-
cific market, and try to understand through the signal which type 
of traders are in, and are operating in a specific market. 
We can meet a large variety of different traders with different 
strategies and, hence, this influences a market in its characteristic.  
Order anticipators are very usual to find in a market; they are 
speculators who try to profit by trading before other traders trade. 
Order anticipators include front-runners, sentiment-oriented tech-
nical traders and squeezers. 
Front runners34 collect information about trades that other traders 
have to decide to arrange. This kind of trade has different impli-
cations, this depends on who he/she is front-running (informed or 
uninformed trader), hence, he can play the market less or more 
efficiently.                                                                
However, the long-running effect of front-running informed trad-
ers are still negative (they make the price less informative). Front-
runners decrease the profit that informed traders make. As a con-
sequence, fewer informed traders will trade profitably. 
Front-runners generally make markets less liquid, also because 
they do not provide service to the traders they front-run. 
Similar to front-runners are the sentiment-oriented technical trad-
ers that try to predict the trades that uninformed traders will de-
cide to make. They try to predict trading decisions that other trad-
ers have not yet made. Sentiment-oriented technical traders are 
like front-runners because they try to trade before other traders; 
                                                          
34 See Cap. 2.3 Critical view of the literature. 
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they therefore accelerate the impact that other traders will have 
on price. Their trading tends to make price less informative and 
they decrease liquidity. 
To conclude the analysis of order anticipators we have the squeez-
ers, they try to monopolize one side of a market so that anyone 
who wants to liquidate a position on the other side must negotiate 
with them35. Squeezers are order anticipators because they trade 
before other traders have the chance to trade. Sunshine traders 
have to be really careful about the bluffers, if they decide to trade 
in a market where there is a high presence of these traders, they 
could have great loss. Bluffers are profit-motivated traders who 
try to fool other traders into trading unwisely36. 
Sunshine traders, as we know, try to make the market really trans-
parent, and bluffers are practically traders who actuate the oppo-
site strategies, their aim is to affect the information that traders 
use to make their trading decisions, so, it is possible that these 
traders can be replaced by sunshine traders. The most famous 
bluffers are rumormongers, they disseminate false information, 
or, they disseminate true information, in a manner that they be-
lieve traders will misinterpret. However, if a trader is able to un-
derstand what the bluffer is trying to do (looking at the fundamen-
tal value) it will be easy to make a profit out of the bluffer. 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter37, insider trading is 
really important in order to understand a market. 
Sunshine trading and insider trading seem really far from each 
other but, many times, the choice between these two strategies 
could be made by the same trader; even if these are two opposite 
strategies, generally the trader who wants to actuate sunshine 
trading also hypothesizes the possibility to use information in a 
different way, as well as insider trading. 
                                                          
35 Actually this strategy is illegal in a lot of market, f.e. it is illegal in U.S. 
36 Trading Exchanges, Larry Harris 2003. 
37 Anonymous traders and Insider trading phenomenon (Cap. 1.4) 
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Anyway, as we discussed, many times insider trading is not avail-
able and it remains just a way to make a better analysis (if it were 
legal, insider trading may be the most profitable choice). 
 
4.2 Sunshine trading impacts 
 
The choice of sunshine trading is a strategy that involves changes 
from the point of view of the impacts. I decided to perform the 
analysis of these effects starting from different studies by Admati 
(1986) and Pfelieder (1984), but especially from Hellwig's (1985) 
we can go into an analysis that studies what effects sunshine trad-
ing has on the market. Taking into account the models explained 
in Chapters 1 and 2 we can develop a model very similar to that 
of Hellwig (1980). 
Assuming one riskless asset and one risky asset; a hypothetical 
trading takes place in period 1 and consumption in period 2; the 
risky asset pays off a random quantity ?̃? in period 2. 
In this scenario there is a continuous speculation 𝑥 𝜖[0,1] that, if 
a trader decides to enter into the market, can trade in the risky 
asset. In general, speculators engage the orders from the liquidity 
traders and can therefore be assumed as market makers who cre-
ate liquidity. Speculators look at the signal 𝑌?̃? = ?̃? + 𝜖?̃? before 
the trading takes place, where 𝜖?̃?’s are independent from traders. 
As demonstrated in chapter 2, we can assume two different types 
of trading: announcers and non-announcers. Announcers gener-
ally have a quantity of demand equal to speculators for the risky 
asset, it is denoted by ?̃? and with a variance c. If preannounce-
ment operates correctly, and the traders before the trading show 
the value of  ?̃? to the market, and they are required to trade pre-
cisely this number of shares in the declared trading period. When 
I assume that pre-announcers disclose their intentions, they for 
the market are assumed as liquidity traders. Contrary, the non-
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announcers demands are never known before the trading takes 
place. I assumed that the total demand of non-announcers is de-
noted by ?̃?, and its variance is d. 
For simplicity of my analysis, I made the following assumption 
about preferences and distributions: 
 The random variables ?̃?, 𝜖?̃?, ?̃? and  ?̃? have zero means are 
normally distributed and mutually independent. 
 The utility function for speculators is assumed as exponential 
with risk aversion coefficient equal to 1. 
 Speculators, using their private information, maximize their 
expected utility ex ante. 
Bearing in mind what is enlarged in Grossman and Miller (1988) 
we can assume a fixed cost that speculators must preserve to be 
present in the market for the risky asset. I also assume that entry 
costs are reinforced before the signals of ?̃? is observed; the quan-
tity of the market is thus determined endogenously by the entry 
decision of speculators. 
 
4.3 Effects of Preannouncement 
 
I scanned the effects of preannouncement based on the logic of 
this strategy where the traders disclose a certain order as coming 
from liquidity traders. Then, I assumed that the entry cost for 
speculators is zero, in this way all the speculators have an in-
formative private signal. From Hellwig’s (1980) analysis, that 
elaborates a rational expectation model with an infinite number 
of traders (same observation was made by Pfleiderer(1984) and 
Admati(1985)) when preannouncement is not detected into the 
market, the expected rational equilibrium is: 
?̃? = 𝛾𝑅?̃? + 𝛾𝑆?̃? + 𝛾𝐷?̃? 
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Where  
𝛾𝑅 =
𝑥(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1
(𝑥2 + 𝑥)(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1
 
And 
𝛾𝑆 = 𝛾𝐷 =
𝑥(𝑥(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1
(𝑥2 + 𝑥)(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1
 
When preannouncement is not discovered into the market, the to-
tal liquidity demand unpredicted is ?̃? + ?̃?. This explains why all 
of the coefficients are functions of s and d only through s + d. 
Anyway, if the total demand of non-announcers is assumed as ?̃?, 
their expected trading cost, indicated by CD, is: 
 
𝐶𝐷 = 𝐸 (?̃?(?̃? − ?̃?)) = 𝐸 (?̃?(𝛾𝑅?̃? + 𝛾𝑆?̃? + 𝛾𝐷?̃? − ?̃?)) = 𝛾𝐷?̃? 
 
The last equality exploits the fact that ?̃?, 𝑆, and ?̃? are independ-
ent. The expected trading cost when announcers don’t prean-
nounce their demands is CS= γss. 
Hence, if we assume that pre-announcement is identified, and 
given the fact that the total liquidity demand is ?̃? + ?̃? and the ex-
pected value of ?̃? is equal to zero, the expected utility of the li-
quidity demand when preannouncement happen is ?̃?. If pre-an-
nouncement takes place, then, the unknown part is equal to  ?̃? 
(with variance d). This is less than 𝑠 + 𝑑 the variance when pre-
announcement doesn’t occur. 
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Now I did the same analysis but, this time with the hypothesis that 
preannouncement is disclosed into the market. From the studies 
of Admati (1985),Hellwig(1980) and Pfleiderer (1984) it follows 
that the equilibrium price with preannouncement is: 
 
?̃?∗ = 𝛾𝑅
∗ ?̃?∗ + 𝛾𝑆
∗?̃?∗ + 𝛾𝐷
∗ ?̃?∗ 
Where 
𝛾𝑅
∗ =
𝑥𝑑 + 1
(𝑥2 + 𝑥)𝑑 + 1
 
𝛾𝑆
∗ =
𝑥(𝑥𝑑 + 1)
(𝑥2 + 𝑥)𝑑 + 1
 
And 
𝛾𝐷
∗ =
𝑥2𝑛
(𝑥2 + 𝑥)𝑑 + 1
 
 
The value 𝛾𝑆
∗?̃? does not influence the informativeness of the price 
and it is assumed as a constant that speculators are aware of. The 
expected trading costs of the announcers are 𝐶𝑆
∗ = 𝛾𝑆
∗𝑠. 
Anyway, for preannounces there are different implications: 
1. The implication of this analysis for the preannouncement is 
that expected trading costs of the announcers are significantly 
lower when announcement occurs with respect to when it 
does not. 
2. Expected trading costs of the no-announcers are considerably 
higher when preannouncement occurs rather than when it 
does not. 
3. The ex-ante expected utility of speculators plummets with 
preannouncement. The equilibrium price with preannounce-
ment (?̃?*) is more informative about ?̃? than is the equilibrium 
price without preannouncement (?̃?) 
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4. The variance of (?̃? − ?̃?*) is remarkably lower than the vari-
ance of (?̃? − ?̃?)  
5. For some parameters, the variance of ?̃?* exceeds the variance 
of ?̃?, and for other parameters the opposite is true38.       
The first two points are about the expected trading costs of liquid-
ity traders. It is useless to decompose liquidity trade costs into 
two components: risk bearing costs and adverse selection costs39. 
Preannouncement has the consequence of reducing the risk-bear-
ing costs for announcers as well as non-announcers, this is be-
cause it provides more information to speculators and therefore 
reduces the riskiness of the risky asset. On the other hand, it also 
reduces the adverse-selection costs for the announcers40. 
The third point figures out that pre-announcement makes specu-
lators ex-ante worse-off. If there is little noise in the price there is 
little uncertainty about the pay-off of the risky assets, and specu-
lators are able to pull out less consumer surplus from liquidity 
traders. 
It should be noted that third part is sensitive to the assumption 
that all the speculators have the same precision of private infor-
mation. This happens because preannouncement reduces the in-
formational advantage that the better informed speculators have 
over speculators with poor private information, and this benefits 
the poorly informed speculators. The conclusions about these 
three points seem robust also taking into consideration past stud-
ies, especially with Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). 
When the informative part is sufficiently small but positive, the 
uninformed are better with preannouncement and can offset the 
informed for their loss in welfare due to preannouncement. 
                                                          
38 Proof and explanations are in the appendix.  
39 Amply discussed in Glosten and Milgrom (1985); Kyle (1985); Subrahman-
yan (1991). 
40 The effect of preannouncement in trading \cost are discussed into the 
model of Roell (2000) and the result are very similar to my observation. 
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The last three points affect the consequence of preannouncement 
on the variability of price changes and on the variability of the 
price itself. Intuitively, preannouncement leads to a more in-
formative price (and, as consequence, less variable price 
changes). This is intuitively obvious, since traders have strictly 
better information about ?̃? through the price when preannounce-
ment takes place. Preannouncement has an ambiguous effect on 
the variance of the price itself. Recall that ?̃? = 𝛾𝑅?̃? + 𝛾𝑆?̃? +
𝛾𝐷?̃?; thus, using the independence of ?̃?, ?̃?, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̃?, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̃?) =
𝛾𝑅
2 + 𝛾𝑆
2; + 𝛾𝐷
2. 
 
4.4 Financial Market evaluation 
 
To focalize our analysis on the traders’ strategy we can build a 
model which represents the passage in a financial market. 
The problem we are interested in is how a trader can optimize his 
approach to a market with a given order. I assumed that a trader 
would buy 𝑋0 units of a security over a fixed time period [0,T]. 
Suppose the trader completes the order in N+1 trades at time 
𝑡0, 𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑁 where 𝑡0 = 0 and 𝑡𝑁 = 𝑇. 
Then I have 𝑋𝑡𝑁 as operation at time 𝑡𝑁. 
Hence, the strategy could be assumed as: 
∑ 𝑋𝑡𝑁
𝑁
𝑛=0
= 𝑋0 
We can imagine moving the parameter depending on the strategy 
adopted and, as a consequence, we can have different evaluations 
where we move parameters like: 
{0 ≤ 𝑡0, 𝑡1, … 𝑡𝑁−1}  set of time  
and trade of size  {𝑋𝑡0 , 𝑋𝑡1 , … 𝑋𝑡𝑁: 𝑋𝑡𝑛 ≥ 0; ∀𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (1)} 
106 
 
 
Let 𝛩𝐷 denote the set of strategies: 
𝛩𝐷 = {{𝑋𝑡0 , 𝑋𝑡1 , … 𝑋𝑡𝑁}: 0 ≤ 𝑡0, 𝑡1, … 𝑡𝑁−1 ≤ 𝑇; 𝑋𝑡𝑛
≥ 0 ∀𝑛; ∑ 𝑋𝑡𝑁 = 𝑋0
𝑁
𝑛=0
} 
 
I can assume the price of the operation as ?̅?𝑛 for the trade 𝑋𝑡𝑛. The 
trader selects his strategy over a given trading horizon T to reduce 
the expected total cost of his purchase: 
min
𝑋𝜖𝛩𝐷
𝐸0 [∑ ?̅?𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=0
𝑋𝑛] 
 
It is good also for a trader taking into consideration not only these 
elements but also the past operations in relation to the market. 
As we have seen previously, to make a specific analysis I want to 
focalize on the Limit order book market (that is one of the most 
frequent market operations). 
A limit order is an order to trade a given number of shares of a 
security at a determined price. In a market managed by a limit 
order book (LOB), traders are able to post their supply demand in 
the form of limit orders to an electronic trading system. 
If 𝑞𝐴(𝑃) is the density of limit orders to sell at price P, and  𝑞𝐵(𝑃) 
be the density of limit orders to purchase at price P. The number 
of sell orders in a short price interval [P, P+dP] is 𝑞𝐴(𝑃)𝑑𝑃. 
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 You generally have: 
𝑞𝐴(𝑃) {
+  𝑃 ≥ 𝐴
0  𝑃 < 0
                              𝑞𝐵(𝑃) {
0   𝑃 ≥ 𝐵
+  𝑃 < 𝐵
 
 
Where A ≥ B are the best ask and bid prices, separately 
𝑉 = (𝐴 + 𝐵)/2                                 𝑠 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 
V is the mid-quote price and s is the bid-ask spread. 
A limit order at time t is defined by the function: 
𝑞(𝑃; 𝐹𝑡; 𝑍𝑡; 𝑡) 
𝐹𝑡 describes the fundamental value of the security and 𝑍𝑡 is the 
set of state variables that could affect the LOB as, for example 
past trades. 
𝐹𝑡  (fundamental value) could be assumed as Brownian motion 
given the fact that, when there are any traders, the mid-quote price 
could change thanks to news about the fundamental values. 
Anyway, 𝑉𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡 in absence of any traders. We can imagine, for 
simplicity, that the only set of relevant state variables is 𝑍𝑡 (the 
history of past trades). 
I assumed that the shift in the mid quote price is linear in the total 
trade and, it is equal to: 
𝑉0+ = 𝐹0 + 𝜆𝑋0 
With 0 < λ <1  
𝜆𝑋0 Corresponds to the permanent impact of trade 𝑋0.  
The impact on asking price can be assumed as 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐹0 +
𝑠
2
+
𝜆𝑋0, taking into account how the permanent impact can influence 
the movement of the markets. 
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To give continuity to the analysis carried out previously and for 
effecting the analysis in a more simplified way I preferred to take 
the 𝑋0 value as previously assumed in chapter 3.  Now assume 
𝑋0 = 𝑋/𝑉 and, I decided to take the same value normalized pre-
viously equal to 0.1. 
4.4.1 Temporary impacts 
 
This problem has led several authors to modify the conventional 
settings. As I said before Almgren and Chriss (1999, 2000) and 
Huberman and Stanzl (2005) discussed what concerns the tempo-
rary impact and in the previous chapter we have analyzed the con-
cept in a deep way. 
We can say that, the temporary price impact gives additional flex-
ibility in dealing with the continuous-time limit of the problem. 
The temporary price impact reflects an important aspect of the 
market, namely the difference between short-term and long term 
supply/demand. 
In addition to the effect of preannouncement impact, then it is 
useful to introduce a way to evaluate the effect of temporary im-
pact on markets. 
Starting from the last equation we can add also another element 
𝑉0+ = 𝐹0 + 𝜆 (
𝑋
𝑉
) + 𝛾 (
𝑋
𝑉
) 
Where 𝑉0+ is the mid-quote price, 𝜆 (
𝑋
𝑉
) represents the permanent 
impact and 𝛾 (
𝑋
𝑉
) the temporary impact. 
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4.5 Sunshine trading: permanent 
and temporary impacts 
 
After we have analyzed a practical and linear way in order to es-
timate the permanent and temporary impact we can concentrate 
our analysis on sunshine trading. 
Firstly, taking all the results on the chapter 3, and, normalizing all 
the results, we can elaborate some assumption in relation to the 
model: 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡 + 𝜆 (
𝑋
𝑉
) + 𝛾 (
𝑋
𝑉
) 
And 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡 +
𝑆
2
+ 𝜆 (
𝑋
𝑉
) + 𝛾 (
𝑋
𝑉
) 
From a graphical way we can easily analyze how the stock market 
can be influenced, assuming as fundamental value a value that for 
the history of the stock can be assumed as true. 
However, as mentioned in chapter 3, we have a normalized vol-
ume size for (X/V) that I, for simplicity, presumed as always 
equal, but this element clearly depends on particular characteris-
tics of the markets. 
The Following figure 1 and 2 represents the permanent, tempo-
rary and total impact of the selected stocks in chapter 3 before the 
introduction of trading strategies.  
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Figure 1 
                                                    
Figure 2 
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4.5.1 Moving impact 
 
From my previous observation enlarged and confirmed in a con-
sistent way from past studies, we can easily assume that, when we 
adopt a particular strategy, as a consequence the parameter for 
temporary and permanent impact could change. 
So we can assume that: 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡 + 𝜋 (𝜆 (
𝑋
𝑉
)) + 𝛩 (𝛾 (
𝑋
𝑉
)) 
It is hard to choose how these parameters can be moved in order 
to make a better assumption on how sunshine trading can change 
the impacts. 
My observation, amply discussed previously, makes me assume 
that sunshine traders are uninformed traders, this kind of strategy 
cannot be considered by a trader who is well informed on what is 
the fundamental value, hence, for this reason I should assume that 
their trades should therefore result in a smaller permanent price 
change. This can be presumed as a smaller value for(𝜆 (
𝑋
𝑉
)). 
We can reanalyze the impact assuming a lower permanent price 
impact and, at the same time an increase in temporary impact. 
Taking into account these assumptions verified above and con-
sidering studies of Admati(1991), Gennotte and Leland(1990), 
Roell(1990), Ross(1989), Almgren and Chriss(2000) and Huber-
man and Stanzl(2005) I assumed, in an approximate way, a re-
duction for permanent impact which is manifested assuming 𝜋 =
0.75 and an increase in temporary impact that occurs with 𝛩 =
1.25. 
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The figure 3 and 4 shows the impact results. 
Figure 3 – Total impact with sunshine Trading 
Figure 4 – Percentage changing of sunshine trading strategy from fig-
ure 1. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show that the observed impact changing from the 
starting point of figures (Figure 1, 2) to a sunshine trading strat-
egy. From the traders point of view, an action that has a signifi-
cant impact in relation to market activities provokes higher costs, 
when a trader is in the buy-side of a market (we use the buy side 
to give a continuum to our analysis above, but, the same consid-
eration can be done for the sell-side), he/she will prefer this strat-
egy if the percentage changes on impacts are reduced from the 
starting point. 
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In the sample that we used we can see how, when the trader is on 
the buy-side, that it could be interesting to use sunshine trading 
for the stocks: APPL, A, GM, TSCO. These have the most signif-
icant market change in order to reduce the impacts. 
On the other hand, this strategy will be inconvenient if the trader 
wants to buy stocks like MIJT, IR, HD, LLL. 
However, concerning the effect of sunshine trading on market 
transparency, it is also interesting to note that the impacts are 
strictly related to this concept, in fact the smaller the impacts the 
closer the market price to the fundamental value. 
Obviously, the reduction of impacts is closely related to several 
factors. In fact, from this point of view the results don’t give us a 
clear vision as a real general lowering of impacts is not testable 
due to sunshine trading; this strongly confirm the study linked to 
uniformed traders, so we usually say that the sunshine trading for-
mula does not reflect a real form of improved market transpar-
ency, as those who possess information and intend to exploit them 
surely will not adopt this strategy. 
 
4.5.2 Extension: Other kind of strategies 
 
The model analyzed before, based on temporary and permanent 
impact, gives us the ability not only to understand that sunshine 
trading has certain effects on the market, but, with the same ob-
servations we can analyze different market scenarios, and, figure 
out which strategy to use and, why not, to study the impact of our 
intentions even before we enter a market. 
I decided to create two different scenarios that are very close to 
two different trading strategies already discussed above, in order 
to see two different movements of impacts. 
Looking at what we have seen from the sunshine trading obser-
vations we can manage the two parameters in order to observe 
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how the impact market changes, for example if we look at a strat-
egy similar to insider trading, in accordance to what I said in 
chapter 2 and with the confirmation of past studies of Huddart and 
Hughes and Levine(2001); Finnerty (1994); Theissen(2003) and 
Williams(2004) we can conclude that insider trading strategy has 
a great incidence on permanent impact and on the other hand, as-
suming that insider traders are informed traders, the temporary 
effect is relatively low. 
Keeping in consideration this observation, when we move our pa-
rameters and give great weight to the permanent impact respect 
to temporary impact, we are moving through a more informed 
trading strategy, similar to an insider trading operation. 
On the other hand we should also imagine a possible scenario 
where, our strategy has a great impact on temporary effects in re-
spect to the permanent. Whit this perspective it could be very in-
teresting to assume a strategy similar to the bluffing strategy. 
This kind of strategy is interesting, from a bluffer’s point of view, 
I have seen that they are profit motivated traders, they have as 
their goal the capacity to move the temporary impact to make 
profit through the noise that voluntarily they create. 
However, bluffing is very risky, if it doesn’t work, the trader will 
lose a lot of money. Taking into consideration these observations 
and in accordance with the studies of Chen, Reveens, Pennok 
(2009) and Shakroborty and Yilmaz (2007) we can manage the 
temporary and permanent impact with great incidence on tempo-
rary impact in order to assume a strategy consequence similar to 
a bluffer strategy and generally related to a noisy trader. 
From these observations I assumed two different scenarios: one, 
very similar to a possible scenario of an insider trader, giving 
more weight to the permanent impact (π=1.5 and Θ=0.5), and, the 
other one very similar to an hypothetical bluffer trader (π=0.5 and 
Θ=1.5); figure 5, 6, 7,8 shows the impact results. 
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Figure 5: Total impacts when π=1.5 and Θ=0.5. 
 
Figure 6: observed impact changing of figure 5 from the starting point of 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 7: Total impacts when π=0.5 and Θ=1.5. 
 
Figure 8: observed impact changing of figure 7 from the starting point of 
Figure 1. 
 
A strategy like the ones that we analyzed here, very similar to a 
possible insider trader strategy, can give us the name of stock that 
is more useful respect to the other. From the figure 5 – 6 we can 
see how, a “hypothetical” insider trader can choose the stocks that 
have a percentage change near to 0%, given the fact that his in-
tention is to create less noise possible in relation to the market, 
he/she knows the fundamental value and, he/she will not invest in 
stocks too risky. 
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Contrary, for figure 7 – 8, that observes a strategy closer to the 
bluffers, it will be a different kind of analysis, I will start assum-
ing the subject as an uninformed trader and as consequence we 
would to select the stocks that create the biggest changing on im-
pacts, in order to create a great noise. 
Hence, for this reason it can be profitable choose to bluff in stocks 
like APPL, MDT, A, IR, HD, GM, all stocks that from our anal-
ysis provoke great impact changing. 
With this analysis, starting from a dataset of the most common 
stock in S&P 500, observed from variation measurement of one 
minutes’ time, I tried to determine how a specific drift and a spe-
cific operation can bring effects that affect future trends. I tried to 
make an analysis that reflects in the most pragmatic way the real-
ity of the stock world, putting myself in the shoes of an investor 
on the verge of a specific market operation, and then, considering 
all the data processed in this paper, I tried to come to a conclusion 
in relation to which action, industry and market is more suitable 
to its level of risk, its strategic style, and its ability to contribute 
to the transparency of the market itself. 
Finally, for the purpose of managing the market, this method of 
analysis can be a great instrument for making decisions; the figure 
of impacts divided between permanent and temporary are funda-
mental to the analysis of a trader, whether he/she is considered an 
informed trader or he/she is not. The market, as a subject can be 
considered informed, is always subject to hypothetical changes 
that might be incomprehensible. From that, an optical type of tem-
porary and permanent impacts may be the right way to try to pre-
dict how the market can change. 
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Conclusions 
 
My analysis aimed to show a linear model that could represent 
the impacts that may occur on a market and, starting from this 
element, studying the possible market strategies in relation to the 
sensitivity of the impacts themselves. In that way I have seen, 
getting different results, in which market or stock trend I can ap-
proach a particular trading strategy. 
I started by selecting a dataset of the last two years movement of 
the S&P 500 stocks, from January 2014 to December 2015, in 
order to analyze in a detailed way the sensibility of markets. My 
personal purpose was to portray the market through few numbers 
of input variables. I based my analysis principally on the study of 
volume, in fact, the level of market activity is known to vary sub-
stantially in different periods of the trading day and this influ-
ences all market processes. 
I assumed that the market impact can be considered as temporary 
and permanent. To represent these two components I postulated 
that the function for these two impacts are power laws, and I 
found the parameter through linear regression data and making 
several hypothesis. 
My goal was to resume the temporary and permanent impact in 
only one value that could capture all the elements that move the 
impact itself. 
I selected two different stocks (GOOGL and GM) of two different 
markets in order to see clearly the difference of the model results. 
Through the parameters that I chose, we can see how the level of 
mobility of each day can influence the evaluation of a stock, and 
also how permanent and temporary impacts are strictly related to 
all the values that are used from a trader when he/she analyzes the 
market. 
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Studying closely the results for all the stocks selected we have the 
chance to understand which hypothetical strategy to adopt. 
One particular characteristic that stands out from these figures is 
how, in this way, also for stocks in the same sector there could be 
completely different observations. 
For the temporary impact, we can look at three different periods 
of time, this element is really important in an optical of trading 
where there could be the difficulty in choosing a specific trading 
strategy. This gives an evaluation of how an impact can persist 
over time being a crucial element for the selection of stocks for 
particular trading strategies. 
Starting with the analysis made up to this point (largely explained 
in chapter 3), I focused more on the possible points of view that a 
market participant may have when they are faced with specific 
situations, in this way we are able to have a broader perspective 
and we are also able to have clearer ideas not only on sunshine 
trading, but also for the markets in general. 
My analysis concluded with the affirmation that a sunshine trader 
is an uninformed trader, this kind of strategy cannot be considered 
by a trader who is well informed about the fundamental value, for 
this reason I found out how their traders should therefore result in 
a smaller permanent price change and, at the same time an in-
crease in temporary impact. The result of these strategies were 
significant; from the traders’ point of view, an action that had a 
significant impact in relation to market activities provoked higher 
costs, meanwhile, when a trader was in the buy-side of a market, 
he/she preferred this strategy if the percentage changes on im-
pacts are reduced from the starting point. 
In the sample that we have used in chapter 4 we have seen how, 
when the trader is on the buy-side, it could be interesting to use 
sunshine trading for the stocks that had the most significant mar-
ket change in order to reduce the impacts. 
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However, concerning the effect of sunshine trading on market 
transparency, it was also interesting to note that the impacts were 
strictly related to this concept, in fact the smaller the impacts the 
closer the market price to the fundamental value. 
Obviously, the reduction of impacts was closely related to several 
factors. In fact, from this point of view the results didn’t give us 
a clear vision as a real general lowering of impacts was not testa-
ble due to sunshine trading. This strongly confirmed the study 
linked to uniformed traders, so we have said that the sunshine 
trading formula did not reflect a real form of improved market 
transparency, as those who possess information and intend to ex-
ploit them surely will not adopt this strategy. 
To conclude I carried out the same analysis of sunshine trading 
on two more kinds of strategies. The model analyzed, based on 
temporary and permanent impact, gave us the ability not only to 
understand that sunshine trading has certain effects on the market, 
but, with the same observations we can analyze different market 
scenarios, and, figure out which strategy to use and why, to study 
the impact of our intentions even before we enter a market. 
In conclusion, I can say that the analysis of stock trends are very 
useful to understand the strategy to adopt when a trader wants to 
evaluate a market. 
From my calculations, we can conclude that sunshine trading 
seems to be a strategy that, apparently, could be interpreted as a 
strategy that encourages transparency in the markets. However, 
from my analysis, sunshine trading being a strategy used by un-
informed traders, doesn’t bring good information, but on the con-
trary, it creates a higher deviation from the fundamental value, 
and this happens especially when there are big orders from sun-
shine traders. 
On the other hand, from a merely technical point of view, a pre-
announcement gives you a more relaxed approach, but this can 
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only occur when regulations are implemented based on the pur-
suit of transparency from all the operators of a market. 
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Appendix 
 
For the first point we have 
𝐶𝑆 + 𝐶𝑆 =
𝑥𝑠(𝑥(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 𝑥2𝑑 + 1)
((𝑥2 + 𝑥)𝑑 + 1)((𝑥2 + 𝑥)(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1)
< 0. 
For the second point we have 
𝐶𝐷 − 𝐶𝐷
∗ =
𝑥3𝑠𝑑
((𝑥2 + 𝑥)𝑑 + 1)((𝑥2 + 𝑥)(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1)
> 0. 
To prove the third point, we use the following Lemma, which is 
explained in Admati and Pfleiderer (1987). 
First we define Δ to be the total cost savings of the liquidity trad-
ers (announcers and nonannouncers) due to preannouncement. 
From the first two points we have: 
𝛥 = (𝐶𝑆 + 𝐶𝐷) − (𝐶𝑆
∗ + 𝐶𝐷
∗) 
=
𝑥𝑠(𝑥(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1)
((𝑥2 + 𝑥)𝑑 + 1)((𝑥2 + 𝑥)𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1)
> 0 
Thus, the total expected trading costs of liquidity traders are lower 
with preannouncement. 
Now let 
𝛩 ≡
(𝑥2 + 𝑥)(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1
𝑥2(𝑠 + 𝑑)2 + 𝑥2(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 2𝑥(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1
 
And 
𝛩∗ ≡
(𝑥2 + 𝑥)𝑑 + 1
𝑥2(𝑠𝑑 + 𝑑2) + (𝑥2 + 2𝑥)𝑑 + 1
 
The expected utility of a speculators without preannouncement is 
−(𝛩)1/2 exp(−𝑤), and without preannouncement it is 
−(𝛩∗)1/2 exp(−𝑤).  
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Let ϑ be the amount of money would be willing to pay to prohibit 
preannouncement. In other words, 𝜗 solves 
−(𝛩)1/2 exp(−𝑤 + 𝜗) = −(𝛩∗)1/2 exp(−𝑤), 
 
Or  
𝜗 =
1
2
log (
𝛩∗
𝛩
). 
We want to show that 
1
2
log (
𝛩∗
𝛩
) < 𝛥 or, in words, that the maxi-
mum amount speculators would pay to prohibit preannouncement 
is lower than the savings in trading costs of the liquidity traders 
due to preannouncement. 
First note that sicne 𝛩∗ > 𝛩, 
1
2
log (
𝛩∗
𝛩
) < log (
𝛩∗
𝛩
) <
𝛩∗
𝛩
− 1 
It is straightforward to show that 
𝛩∗
𝛩
− 1
=
𝑥𝑠(𝑥(𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1)
((𝑥2 + 𝑥)𝑠 + 𝑑) + 1)(𝑥2𝑠𝑑 + 𝑥2𝑑2 + 𝑥2𝑑 + 2𝑥𝑑 + 1)
. 
Consider now the ratio (
𝛩∗
𝛩
− 1) to Δ. This is given by 
1
𝛥
(
𝛩∗
𝛩
− 1) =
𝑥2𝑑 + 𝑥𝑑 + 1
𝑥2𝑠𝑑 + 𝑥2𝑑2 + 𝑥2𝑑 + 2𝑥𝑑 + 1
< 1. 
It follows that Δ >
1
2
log(
𝛩∗
𝛩
). The other points are straightforward 
and therefore omitted. 
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